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Alice Woolley*

Tending the Bar: The "Good Character"
Requirement for Law Society Admission1

Every Canadian law society requires that applicants for bar admission be of "good
character" The author assesses the administration of this requirement and its
stated purposes of ensuring ethical conduct by lawyers, protecting the public and
maintaining the profession's reputation. In particular, the premise underlying the
use of the good character requirement to fulfill those purposes - that character
is the "well-spring of professional conduct in lawyers" - is subjected to critical
examination through the theoretical principles of Artistotelian virtue ethics and
the empirical evidence of social psychology. The primary thesis of this paper
is that as currently justified, administered and applied the good character
requirement cannot be defended and must not be maintained. The secondary
thesis of the paper, however, is that given the relationship.- albeit a qualified
one - between character and ethical conduct, a reformed version of the good
character requirement can, and arguably should, be maintained by the provincial
law societies.
Tous les barreaux canadiens exigent que les candidats I I'admission soient
de "bonne moeurs ,. L'auteur se penche sur la fagon dont cette exigence est
administree et sur ses objectifs officiels qui sont de s'assurer du comportement
6thique des avocats, de protdger le public et de pr6server la reputation de la
profession. En particulier, la prdmisse qui sous-tend I'utilisation de I'exigence
relative la bonne moralit afin d'atteindre ces objectifs - que le caract~re est
garant de la conduite professionnelle des avocats - fait I'objet d'un examen
critique , la lumiere des principes d'6thique avanc6s par Aristote et des preuves
empiriques de la psychologie sociale. La these primaire de cet article est
que, telle que I'exigence relative 6 la bonne moralit6 est actuellement justifide,
administr6e et appliqu6e, est ind~fendable et ne doit pas 6tre maintenue. La
these secondaire, cependant, est qu' tant donn6 la relation - meme caract~ris6e
- entre le caractere et le comportement 6thique, une version r~visse de I'exigence
relative . la bonne moralit6 peut 6tre maintenue par les barreaux provinciaux et
peut-6tre m~me devrait-elle 6tre conservde.

LL.B. (Toronto); LL.M. (Yale); Faculty of Law, University of Calgary.
1. I would like to extend particular thanks to Dalhousie Law School for inviting me to present this
paper as the Wickwire Lecture in legal ethics, to Mike Bolitho for his research support, and to Sara
Bagg for her long conversations about virtue ethics and the character requirement. In addition, I would
like to acknowledge the last four years of legal ethics classes at the University of Calgary whose lively
engagement with the question of whether character is the source of ethical behaviour significantly
expanded my own thinking on this question. Any errors are, of course, my own.
*
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Introduction
To be admitted as a member of a provincial law society an individual must
demonstrate that she is of "good character." Or, to be more accurate, she
must demonstrate an absence of behaviour indicating bad character; such
behaviour includes, inter alia, criminal convictions, academic dishonesty
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and dishonesty towards the law society, as well as a failure to rehabilitate
or repent with respect to same.2
That this requirement exists in the abstract is clear. What it means in
practice for prospective Canadian lawyers is, however, much less clear.
While the American equivalent to this requirement has been subjected
to much scrutiny and academic commentary,3 relatively little has been
said about it in Canada. 4 Further, and much more significantly, provincial
law societies-with the notable and laudable exception of the Law
Society of Upper Canada-maintain almost total secrecy with respect to
the administration and enforcement of the good character requirement.5
Decisions about admission are not made public unless they are subject
to judicial review. In addition, only the Law Society of Manitoba 6 has
published standards indicating which factors are relevant for a good
character review.
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the good character
requirement for law society admission. Part I considers enforcement. It
reviews legislative authority for the requirement and the process used
by law societies to administer it. General information is provided about
the frequency with which "character" issues arise and consideration is
given to the limited jurisprudence and commentary. In this way Part I
also identifies the purposes the requirement is meant to fulfil, how good
character has been defined, the standards used for assessing character, and
how those standards have been applied in particular cases.
In order to put this discussion in a broader context, Part II then briefly
discusses the American experience with the "good character" requirement.
It notes commentators' discomfort with the good character requirement in
2.
Some variant of the "good character" requirement exists in every Canadian jurisdiction. See
infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
3.
See Part II, below.
4.
In their books on legal ethics Gavin MacKenzie, Allan Hutchinson and Beverley Smith all
provide some commentary on the good character requirement. MacKenzie in particular provides some
detailed analysis, drawing extensively from the American materials and the very limited law society
jurisprudence. In addition, in the 1970s Mary Southin (then a practising lawyer and Law Society
of British Columbia bencher) provided some important information about how the requirement was
enforced by the Law Society at that time. See: Allan C. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at 61-66; Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics:
ProfessionalResponsibilityand Discipline,looseleaf (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 23-2-2317; Beverley G. Smith, ProfessionalConductfor Lawyers and Judges, 2d ed., looseleaf (Fredericton:
Maritime Law Book, 2002) chapter 12 at paras. 10-16; Mary F. Southin, "What is Good Character"
(1977) 35 Advocate 129-136.
5.
The Nova Scotia Barristers' Society has also now adopted a policy of public hearings on
character. At this time, however, there are no reported decisions on character from the NSBS, although
one case is currently working its way through the system.
6.
See infra note 23.
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the United States and, as well, the different circumstances which (to some
extent, but not entirely) qualify our ability to rely on those commentators'
7
analyses in the Canadian context.
Part III incorporates some of the important American literature to
analyze and critique the good character requirement as currently applied
in Canada. It assesses the administration of the requirement and its
purposes of ensuring ethical conduct by lawyers, protecting the public and
maintaining the legal profession's reputation. In particular, it subjects the
premise underlying the good character requirement-that character is the
"well-spring of professional conduct in lawyers"'--to critical examination
drawing on the theoretical principles of Artistotelian virtue ethics and the
empirical evidence of social psychology. It also considers whether, given
social psychology's claim that circumstances are at least as relevant in
predicting conduct as character, the good character requirement in its
current form is achieving its stated purposes.
Part III concludes that the good character requirement in its current
form is unjustifiable because it provides no meaningful review of the
"character" of most applicants and results in what is, arguably, excessive
scrutiny of others. The secrecy of the process raises serious concerns
both for the rights of potential applicants and for the public whom the
requirement purports to protect. The premise that character predicts
conduct is only partially correct: circumstances are as important as
character in predicting future conduct. As a consequence, the standards
currently used for assessing good character, and the application of those
standards in particular cases, provide little comfort that the purposes of the
good character requirement are being fulfilled. As currently administered
and applied, the good character requirement does not reliably identify
applicants with character issues indicative of future unethical conduct, and
does not protect the public. The primary thesis of this paper is, therefore,
that the good character requirement in its current form should not be
maintained.
On the other hand, there are reasons for maintaining some version of
it. Since "character" plays a role (albeit a qualified one) in determining
the ethics of lawyers, law societies are justified in their concern for the
character of those upon whom they are placing the imprimatur of law
society admission. Thus, as a secondary thesis, this paper argues that a
The most important American article on the good character requirement is the seminal piece by
7.
Deborah L. Rhode, "Moral Character as a Professional Credential" (1985) 94 Yale L.J. 491. The debt
which I owe Professor Rhode's work is enormous, despite the difference in the conclusion which I
reach with respect to the good character requirement.
MacKenzie, supranote 4 at 23-3.
8.
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reformed version of the good character requirement can, and should, be
maintained by the provincial law societies. To this end Part IV suggests
reforms which would render the requirement more accountable, more
principled and therefore more fair. These include identifying precisely
what behaviour is necessary for ethical conduct in legal practice, focusing
on this behaviour rather than immoral behaviour in general, and opening
the good character requirement to public scrutiny.
I.

The good characterrequirementin Canada

1. Legislative authority andprocessfor enforcement of the good
characterrequirement

All Canadian law societies have, through authorizing legislation or their
own rules and regulations, some version of the good character requirement.
Some require that each applicant be of "good character" or have "moral
character,"9 others require that the applicant be of "good character and
reputation"1 while still others require that the applicant be of "good moral
character and a fit and proper person to be admitted."" But in all cases the
general point remains the same: the character of an applicant is of central
significance in deciding whether that applicant is entitled to law society
2
admission.

9. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L-8, s. 27(2): "It is a requirement for the issuance of every
licence under this Act that the applicant be of good character" and An Act respecting the Barreau
du Quebec, R.S.Q. c. B-1 s. 45(2) requiring that the committee shall inquire into an applicant's
"moral character." The "good character" standard is also applied in Saskatchewan, Yukon, Northwest
Territories and Nunavut: Legal ProfessionAct, 1990, S.S. 1990-91, c. L-10.1, s. 24(l)(b); Rules of the
Law Society of Yukon s. 81(1)(d) requiring "two letters of reference and good character satisfactory
to the executive" and LegalProfessionAct, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 134, s. 20(l)(a)(iii) requiring that a person
seeking admission meet all the requirements prescribed by the rules; Legal ProfessionAct (Nunavut),
R.S.N.W.T. i988, c. L-2, s. 18(1); Legal ProfessionAct, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. L-2, s. 18(1).
10. Rules of the Law Society of Newfoundland and Labrador s. 6.03(l)(a) (enacted pursuant to the
Law Society Act, 1999, S.N.L. 1999 c. L-9.1); Law Society Act, S.N.B. 1996, c.89, s. 28(l)(a); Legal
Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, s. 40(l)(a) and (2)(b).
I1. Rules of the Law Society of Manitoba 5-4(c) (enacted pursuant to the Legal ProfessionAct,
C.C.S.M. c. L107, s. 17(5)(b)); Legal ProfessionAct, S.B.C. 1998, c.9, s. 19(1); Nova Scotia Barristers
Society Regulations (made pursuant to the Legal ProfessionAct, S.N.S. 2006, c.28) s. 3.9.2 (c) and
(d).
12. It should be noted that in Prince Edward Island it appears that the requirement only applies to
lawyers from other jurisdictions seeking admission in Prince Edward Island, and not necessarily to
applicants for admission as a student-at-law or as a newly called lawyer (although proof of character
may be required as part of the "further information and evidence" which the Law Society can require of
those applicants). See Legal ProfessionAct, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. L-6.1, ss. 15, 19 (governing eligibility
for membership as a lawyer and as an articled clerk respectively); and The Regulations of the Law
Society of PrinceEdwardIsland (enacted pursuant to the Legal ProfessionAct) s. 11 (which governs
admission of articled clerks and provides for the Council's ability to require "further information and
evidence") and s. 16 (which governs admission of applicants who are members of other provincial law
societies and which requires the filing of "two certificates of good character").
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Each of the law societies also appears to follow a similar process
with respect to the consideration of applicants' characters. An applicant
is required to submit an application form providing information about
matters of apparent relevance to character. A fairly typical form, like that
of the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, asks the applicant whether he has a
criminal record; whether disciplinary actions have been taken or sanctions
imposed against him as "a member of any profession or organization";
whether he has been denied any licence or permit which requires proof of
character; whether he has filed for bankruptcy or a proposal to creditors;
whether there are any civil actions or judgments outstanding against him;
whether he has ever disobeyed a court order; and whether there are any
other matters going to the applicant's character:
Is there, to your knowledge or belief, any event, circumstance, condition
or matter not disclosed in your replies to the preceding questions that
touches or may concern your conduct, character and reputation, and
that you know is or believe might be thought to be an impediment to
your admission or warrant full inquiry by the Nova Scotia Barristers'
Society?13
Other law societies ask similar questions. Some additionally inquire
into: whether the applicant has ever been accused of, or sanctioned for,
academic misconduct; whether she has been convicted of a regulatory
offence; whether she has been "discharged, suspended or asked to resign
from any employment"; whether charges have been instituted against her
as a member of the armed forces or police force; and about the applicant's
mental wellness and the existence of any present or past alcohol and drug
dependencies. 14
In all cases the questions are meant to discover information related
to past acts or circumstances which could indicate an absence of good
character. There is no attempt to discover information which points
to the affirmative existence of good character. There are no questions,

13. Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, "Application for Enrolment in Bar Admission Course & as an
Articled Clerk, Applicant's Questionnaire."
14. All of the above questions are asked by the Law Society of British Columbia in its Application
for Law Society Admission Program Enrolment. The legitimacy of questions about the applicant's
mental wellness and issues with drug and alcohol dependency go to "fitness" rather than character.
As such, while these questions raise significant issues, they are not discussed in this paper. Those
interested in the "fitness" aspect should see Jocelyn Downie, "Law Societies As Arbiters of Mental
Fitness" (2001) 24 Advocates' Q. 467. When in the recommendations section, Part IV, this paper
suggests that fitness for practice is a more coherent basis for consideration of character than the current.
approach, it is referring to fitness in an ethical sense, not fitness as investigated through questions of
this nature.
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for example, about whether an applicant has donated time or money to
charitable organizations.
The law societies also require an applicant to provide information
from another source about her character. In Alberta an applicant is
required to provide two "Certificates of Character and Reputation" which
must be filled out by non-family members who have known the applicant
for more than two years. The knowledge need not be extensive; a law
school professor who has taught the student is deemed to have sufficient
"knowledge" to serve as a reference. In Manitoba more comprehensive
knowledge is required: the applicant must provide a character reference
from a non-family member who has known the applicant for more than
five years.
The law societies use this information to consider whether applicants
have the requisite character for admission. While law societies will
consider information brought to their attention in addition to that provided
by applicants, 5 they do not carry out any independent investigation of
candidates. The system instead relies largely on self-reporting. 6 For those
applicants who do present an issue of character in their applications, the
law societies will investigate further. If the issue appears to be minor the
applicant is permitted to enrol. If, however, the issue is more significant
the application will proceed to a hearing, generally by a committee of
the law society in question. The hearings are held in camera and, with

15. It was, for example, a letter filed by two members of the Law Society of Upper Canada which led
to the recent investigation and hearing into the character of Sharon Shore (discussed below: see infra
note 64 and accompanying text).
16. This statement and the remaining information on the process for enforcing the good character requirement are based on information provided in various phone calls with staff members at the different law societies. Specific details about those phone conversations are available on request from the author. In addition, several phone calls are referenced infra notes
19-21. There is no written information which clearly indicates the process used with respect
to the good character applications. It appears from informal information obtained from colleagues that the Law Society of British Columbia used to briefly interview applicants prior
to admission. It does not appear, however, that these interviews were investigative in nature.

34

The Dalhousie Law Journal

the exceptions of the Law Society of Upper Canada 7 and matters which
proceed to judicial review, committee decisions are not published. 8
It is impossible to determine definitively the number of applicants who
have issues of "character." Informal conversations with law society staff
members indicate, however, that the number is small. The Membership
Secretary of the Law Society of Saskatchewan advised, for example, that
they have never had an issue with an applicant's character. 9 Manitoba's
Director of Professional Education and Competence indicated that of the
60-65 applications the Law Society of Manitoba receives per year, 20
disclose something in response to a good character question and are referred
to the Admission and Education Committee for additional consideration.
However, of those applicants, only one every two years proceeds to a full
hearing, and no applicant has been rejected on the basis of character by
the Law Society of Manitoba for at least five years.2" The Office of the
Registrar for the Law Society of Upper Canada advised that of the 1400
applications received each year, 60-70 indicate the existence of a character
issue.2 ' Again, however, actual denial of admission by the Law Society of
22
Upper Canada is relatively rare.
On what basis are character determinations made by the law societies
once the information has been gathered? Unfortunately this question
is very difficult to answer. With the exception of the Law Society of
Manitoba, which has guidelines for character review, 23 the law societies
17. And now the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society.
18. In Nova Scotia, for example, if someone answers "Yes" to any of the questions on the Articling
Application they appear before a credentials committee (which will ask for more information
or approve the application) or a full credentials inquiry. In Alberta all applications are vetted by a
Membership Services Representative. All serious issues are referred to a staff member who is also a
Member of the Credentials and Education Committee who reviews matters further. That staff member
then writes a memorandum of the facts and the applicable rules of law which is given to the Credentials
and Education Committee for consideration. The Committee then decides if it should approve the
application or if further inquiry is needed. If further inquiry is needed the matter proceeds to a three
person Panel of Inquiry. The Panel of Inquiry issues a decision. The decision is then sent back to the
Credentials and Education Committee which determines the result of the application.
19. Conversation with Cheryl Eberle, Membership Secretary for the Law Society of Saskatchewan,
on July 18, 2006.
20. Conversation with Sheila Redel, Director of Professional Education and Competence, Law
Society of Manitoba, on July 20, 2006.
21. Conversation with Debbie Bryan, Office of the Registrar, Law Society of Upper Canada.
22. Of the fifteen post-1 989 LSUC decisions reviewed for this paper, five applicants were excluded,
three applicants were excluded but ultimately admitted, and six applicants were admitted. In her 1977
paper on the British Columbia Law Society Mary Southin discusses nineteen good character cases
from the 1970s of which two resulted in delayed admission and two resulted in outright exclusion. See
Southin, supranote 4.
23. "Guidelines for Good Character Applications Under Rules 5-3, 5-14(2) and 5-24" [LSM
Guidelines]. These are attached to the "Application for Admission to the Manitoba CPLED Program
and as an Articling Student."
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do not publish standards which indicate what good character means, or the
type of issues which are relevant to a good character determination. 24 In
addition, as already noted, most law societies do not publish their decisions
on matters of character. As a consequence, it is difficult to draw broadly
supported conclusions about what the standards for character are, or how
they are applied in particular cases.
With that caveat, however, the remainder of this section will turn to
a review of the information which does exist on the application of the
good character requirement. In particular, it will analyze the case law and
other materials to identify: 1) the stated purposes of the good character
requirement; 2) the definition of "good character" and the standards used
to measure it; and 3) how the good character definition and standards have
been applied in specific cases.
2.

What are the purposes of the good characterrequirement?

The stated purposes of the good character requirement include "the
protection of the public, the maintenance of high ethical standards, and the
maintenance of public confidence in the legal profession. 25 The first two
of these purposes appear to be largely the same: by ensuring that lawyers
are ethical the public will be protected. The good character requirement
rests on the assumption that character determines behaviour: a person
lacking good character is less likely to maintain high ethical standards and
is more likely to place an unsuspecting public at risk. As stated by Gavin
MacKenzie,
The requirement that applicants be of good character is preventative, not
punitive. It recognizes that characteris the well-spring of professional
conduct in lawyers. By requiring lawyers to be of good character, law
societies protect the public and the reputation of the profession from
potential lawyers who lack the fundamental quality of any person
who seeks to practise as a member of the legal profession, namely,
integrity.26

24. Although the application forms of course provide some indication of areas of concern,
there is no way of determining the type of responses which lead to further investigation by the
law societies, those which do not, and those which, even if inquired into, lead to an actual hearing. The numbers provided by the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Law Society of Manituba suggest significant deviation between initial investigations and final hearings, and there is no
way of accounting substantively for that deviation based on the publicly available information.
25. Re Rajnauth andLaw Society of Upper Canada(1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 381 at 384 [Rajnauth].
26. MacKenzie, supranote 4 at 23-3 [emphasis added]. As discussed below, however while this is
the stated objective of the good character requirement, in setting the standards for character review the
Law Society of Upper Canada has simultaneously eschewed any attempt to measure the likelihood of
future ethical conduct by applicants whose character is at issue.
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The third purpose-maintenance of public confidence in the legal
profession-may also relate to a concern that persons of bad character
will not make ethical lawyers. A perception that (some) lawyers are of
bad character may, in and of itself, be bad for the profession's already
troubled reputation. However, the concern of the law societies appears
to arise more specifically from a concern that the profession's reputation
will suffer if people are admitted whose characters raise concerns about
their prospective conduct as lawyers. That is, it is the perception that
persons of bad character will make unethical lawyers, rather than a general
perception that some lawyers have bad characters, which could damage the
profession's reputation, and it is against this danger that the good character
requirement is directed. It is noted in this respect that in its Guidelines
for Good CharacterApplications the Law Society of Manitoba links the
good character requirement not with the profession's reputation per se,
but with the profession's reputation as a profession constituted of ethical
practitioners. The LSM Guidelines direct decision-makers on character to
consider whether
admission of the applicant would adversely affect the confidence of the
public in the legal profession
in Manitoba as an honourable,ethical and
27
competent profession.

In sum, then, the good character requirement attempts to promote ethical
conduct, protect the public and maintain the profession's reputation by
ensuring that applicants with bad character, who are more likely to act
badly, are not admitted.
What is "good character'"and what standardsare used to measure
it?
How do law societies define the character necessary to meet these purposes?
And what standards do they use to determine whether an applicant has that
character?
At its most basic level, the definition of character used by law societies
rests on a notion of personality, or individuality: character is what makes
us, as individuals, who we are. The Law Society of Upper Canada's oftcited definition of character uses this as its starting point: "Character is
that combination of qualities or features distinguishing one person from
3.

another."

28

27. LSM Guidelines,supra note 23 [emphasis added].
28. Re P (DAM), [1989] O.J. No. 1574 at 22 (QL) [P(DM)]. Please note that page references to this
case are based on a 10-pt Times New Roman PDF downloaded from Quicklaw.
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In addition, and more importantly, the definition of good character is
linked to morality and ethics. It is one's ability to do the right thing-to
act in the right way-which constitutes one's good character.2 9 This is also
expressed in the idea that good character requires the possession of virtues.
As the Law Society of Upper Canada goes on to say: "Good character
connotes moral or ethical strength, distinguishable as an amalgam of
virtuous or socially acceptable attributes or traits which undoubtedly
include, among others, integrity, candour, empathy, and honesty."3& Good
character is thus defined not simply as a matter of moral behaviour, but also
as a matter of having the virtues which will result in moral behaviour.
Character is not fixed, however. The Law Society of Upper Canada
has consistently emphasized that character can change with time, and
that the relevant question is the character of the applicant at the time of
application, not some prior moment; the relevant test is the applicant's
"good character at the time of the hearing."'" The Law Society notes that
the "transition from being a person not of good character to one of good
character is a process, not an event. It may or may not happen to someone
who was not of good character."3
All of these aspects of character are reflected in the definitions given
in the various Law Society of Upper Canada decisions and, as well, by
the frequently cited definition offered by then bencher (and now retired
Justice) Mary Southin in her 1977 article addressing how the good
33
character requirement is administered in British Columbia:

29. In a rather perplexing quotation the Law Society of Upper Canada stated the relationship between
character and behaviour in this way: "Dr. Klassen described the relationship between character and
behaviour, stating that behaviour flows from character. In 1994, the applicant displayed bad behaviour
from which an inference could be drawn about bad character. In 1999, the applicant displayed good
behaviour. The question for Dr. Klassen was whether this was the result of a conscious decision on the
part of the applicant to change his behaviour without an underlying change of character (in which case,
his earlier behaviour was related to transient factors), or whether that good behaviour flowed from the
applicant's bad character as yet unchanged." Preyrav. Law Society of Upper Canada,[2000] L.S.D.D.
No. 60 at para. 33 (QL) [Preyra #1]. The relationship between behaviour and character is discussed
more below with respect to the principles applied to determine who has, and who does not have, good
character.
30. P (DM), supra note 28 at 22. The Law Society has also described good character as "inevitably
judged or perceived as a bundle of virtues": In the Matter of an Application by Michael John Spicer
for Admission to the Law Society of Upper Canada,Reasons of Convocation, May 1, 1994 at para. 23
[Spicer].
31. Preyra #1, supranote 29 at para. 8
32. Ibid. at para. 42.
33. With the significant exception of the LSUC's emphasis on mutability of character, which Southin
expressly rejects: "I have never seen any evidence that the character of grown men and women
improved with age." Southin, supranote 4 at 135.
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Character within the Act comprises in my opinion at least these
qualities:
1. An appreciation of the difference between right and wrong;
2. The moral fibre to do that which is right, no matter how uncomfortable
the doing may be and not to do that which is wrong no matter what
the consequences may be to oneself;
3. A belief that the law at least so far as it forbids things which
are malum in se must be upheld and the courage to see that it is
upheld. 4
An applicant of good character should, then, be someone who, in his
or her individual personality, has demonstrated behaviour consistent with
the possession of moral virtues, and the courage to act in furtherance of
them and the law's morality.
Given this definition, how do the law societies determine whether an
applicant has this character? The approach used in the various published
decisions, and in the LSM Guidelines, is to focus on the applicant's
current character as evidenced by past misconduct but also, and more
importantly, as demonstrated by information about the applicant's current
conduct, reformation and rehabilitation. The applicant has an obligation
to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities and through "clear and
convincing proof based on cogent evidence," 35 that he or she is currently
of good character, taking into account: "a. the nature and duration of
the [prior] misconduct; b. whether the applicant is remorseful; c. what
rehabilitative efforts, if any, have been taken, and the success of such

34. Southin, ibid. at 129.
35. Law Society of Upper Canadav. Birman, 2005 ONLHP 6, [2005] L.S.D.D. No. 13 at para. 6
[Birman #1].
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efforts; d. the applicant's conduct since the proven misconduct. '36 Also of
apparent relevance are circumstances which mitigate the otherwise morally
doubtful prior conduct, including, for example, strains experienced by the
applicant at the time, and alcohol addiction or use.37

The most significant uncertainty about the standards against which
an applicant's character will be judged is the specific relevance of the
likelihood of future misconduct. On the one hand it appears, as discussed in
the previous section, that the prevention of future misconduct by admitted
lawyers is central to the entire existence of the good character requirement.
In at least one case a person was denied admission in part because the Law
Society was not satisfied that he would not re-offend.38 On the other hand,
there exists a strong reluctance to base character determinations on this
consideration. Indeed, the Law Society of Upper Canada has stated on
numerous occasions that an applicant is not required to demonstrate that
he is at low risk of acting badly in the future:
Convocation respectfully believes that the relevant and applicable test is
not whether the risk of further or future abuse by an applicant upon the
public trust is too high, but simply whether the applicant has established
his or her good character on the balance ofprobabilities. Mr. Rizzotto did
not need to demonstrate good character beyond a reasonable doubt, nor
was he obligatedto provide a warrantyor assurancethat in thefuture he
would not breach the public trust. The Act does not permit a Committee
to apply any other test than that relating to the question of an applicant's

36. Ibid. at para. 15. The LSM Guidelines, supranote 23, list fifteen considerations to be taken into
account: 1. the applicant's candour, sincerity and full disclosure in the filings and proceedings as to
character and fitness; 2. the materiality of any omissions or misrepresentations; 3. the nature and extent
of the applicant's voluntary treatment or rehabilitation; 4. the applicant's current attitude about the
subject of their disclosure (e.g. acceptance of responsibility for the renunciation of past wrongdoing,
and remorse); 5. the applicant's subsequent constructive activities and accomplishments; 6. evidence
of character and moral fitness including the reasonably informed opinion of others regarding the
applicant's present moral character; and [sic] 7. in light of the entire record of the applicant, whether
admission of the applicant would adversely affect the confidence of the public in the legal profession
in Manitoba as an honourable, ethical and competent profession; 8. the nature and character of any
offences committed; 9. the number and duration of offences; 10. the age and maturity of the applicant
when any offences were committed; 11.the social and historical context in which any offences were
committed; 12. the sufficiency of the punishment given for any offences; 13. the grant or denial of a
pardon or discharge for any offences committed; 14. the number of years. that have elapsed since the
last offence was committed, and the presence or absence of misconduct during that period; 15. the
extent to which the applicant has made restitution and to which, if known, the restitution was made
voluntarily at the initiative of the applicant, or as a consequence of the order of the Court.
37. Birman #1, supra note 35. See also: Law Society of Upper Canadav. Levesque, [2005] L.S.D.D
No. 38 (QL) [Levesque] andLaw Society of Upper Canadav. Schuchert, [2001] L.S.D.D. No. 63 (QLY
[Schuchert]. For a contrary view of the relevance of stressful circumstances, where the Committee
emphasized the need for a lawyer to be ethical even when under stress, see Law Society of Upper
Canadav. D'Souza, [2002] L.S.D.D No. 62 (QL) [D'Souza].
38. P(DM), supra note 28.
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good character.3

9

With this uncertainty noted, however, it appears that the general matters
of relevance to the determination of good character are straightforward.
They relate to the nature of past misconduct, the circumstances which may
mitigate it, what the applicant has done to address past conduct by way
of reform or rehabilitation, and other information about the applicant's
current moral character.
4. How is the good-characterrequirementapplied in specific cases?
From the limited materials available there thus appears to be a relative
degree of consensus with respect to the purposes of the good character
requirement, the definition ofgood character, and the standards for assessing
character. When, however, one reviews the reported decisions this clarity
quickly evaporates. In this section I will, after providing a summary of the
notable decisions, indicate the wide variation in the treatment of applicants
whose past raises issues of character.
a. A brief history of the applicationof the good characterrequirement
The very first reported decision on the good character requirement is a
1950 decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Martin v. Law
Society of British Columbia.' In Martin the Court held that the Law
Society of British Columbia was entitled to refuse admission on the basis
of character because the applicant was an admitted communist. The Court
held that adherence to the socially destructive goals of communism was
inconsistent with admission to the bar.
Martin is, however, something of a stand-alone decision. There are
no other reported Canadian good character decisions from any time prior
to 1989, and no other reported Canadian decisions either prior to 1989 or
thereafter in which the political beliefs of an applicant have resulted in her
exclusion. Further, Martin has played no precedential role-it has never
been cited-in subsequent good character decisions.
In the modem era, the first decision of note is the 1989 decision of the
Law Society of Upper Canada in P(DM).41 The applicant, DMP, had been
convicted of offences related to sexual acts with two children. One of the
children was a profoundly deaf eight-year-old girl whom he had met while
working as a school bus driver, and with whom he engaged in sexual acts
39. In the Matter of an Application for Admission to the Law Society of Upper Canada by Joseph
Rizzotto, Reasons of Convocation, September 14, 1992 at para. 32 [Rizzotto] [emphasis added]. See
also Preyra#1, supranote 29 at para. 8.
40. [1950] 3 D.L.R. 173 [Martin].
41. Supranote28.
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until she was sixteen. The second child was his seven-year-old biological
daughter, with whom he engaged in sexual activities from the time that
she was four years old. In assessing DMP's character the Law Society
heard evidence about the offences and also about his troubled life. It also
received a variety of highly favourable character references, including
several from lawyers in the law firm for which DPM articled. Additionally,
the Law Society heard expert evidence. Some was supportive and to the
effect that DMP was "not at risk for future sexual misconduct, is truly
remorseful, and is indeed cured,"42 while other expert evidence strongly

challenged this conclusion. Finally, the Committee heard disconcerting
evidence from DMP himself. In particular, the Committee was troubled
by DMP's testimony that he had reached a reasoned conclusion that his
sexual acts were not wrongful, despite his knowledge that society would
condemn them:
Mr. P pointed out that as a university student majoring in philosophy
he had taken an ethics course which had helped him to rationalize that
the only reason for prohibiting adult sexual activities with children was
to protect infants from potential harm. So long as he acted lovingly
towards children, causing them no palpable physical or emotional harm,
it was quite permissible for him, he thought to demonstrate his "love"
by engaging with them in sexual conduct. Thus, if he were guilty of a
crime, it was nonetheless a victimless crime. Having persuaded himself
that because of his love for them D and X had suffered no injury or pain
Mr. P believed
he was free to act as he pleased irrespective of society's
43
strictures.

Based on this evidence, and after setting out the principles discussed in
earlier sections with respect to the definition, purposes and standards of
the good character requirement, the Committee refused to admit DMP.
They concluded that they were "not satisfied" that he had changed the
"moral code and structure of beliefs" which allowed him to engage in this
wrongdoing. 4
Three years after its decision in P(DM) the Law Society of Upper
Canada considered the application of Joseph Rizzotto. 45 Mr. Rizzotto
was employed by the municipality of Frobisher Bay and while there he
committed election fraud-he forged ballots-in an attempt to keep the
incumbent mayor in office. Mr. Rizzotto's forged ballots were identified.
He was charged and convicted after a guilty plea, briefly imprisoned and

42.
43.
44.
45.

Ibid.at 14.
Ibid.at 6.
Ibid.at 24.
Rizzotto, supranote 39.
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released. Upon his release he attended law school at Windsor. He was not
asked about any criminal convictions by Windsor and did not disclose any.
In addition to information about his conviction, evidence was received
by the Law Society concerning the community's continued outrage over
the offence, from professors at Windsor who attested to Rizzotto's good
character, and from Rizzotto himself. The original Committee rejected
Mr. Rizzotto's application for admission, relying on his non-disclosure
of the offence to Windsor, the continued community outrage, a lack of
confidence that he would not again breach the public trust, and a general
lack of faith in his credibility. The Committee's decision was overturned
by Convocation who admitted Rizzotto. Convocation viewed the
Committee's lack of confidence in a future breach of the public trust as
irrelevant (for the reasons cited earlier on the applicable standards). It
held that there had been too much emphasis on the severity of the original
crimes and the non-disclosure to Windsor, and insufficient emphasis on
the references from his professors at Windsor.
Louis Rajnauth was another applicant whose character was viewed
variably. 46 Prior to and during law school Mr. Rajnauth committed
insurance fraud against two insurance companies. In addition, he attempted
to affect the criminal proceedings against him by discouraging potential
witnesses from testifying. The Committee was presented with evidence
about the crimes and also about Mr. Rajnauth's rehabilitation. Two of the
Committee members viewed Mr. Rajnauth as rehabilitated, but one did
not. The minority opinion was accepted by Convocation who declined to
admit Mr. Rajnauth. This decision was upheld on judicial review.
At around the same time the Law Society of Upper Canada also
declined to admit Michael Spicer.47 Mr. Spicer was a graduate of the
University of Saskatchewan law school who was admitted by the Law
Society of Upper Canada as a student-at-law. He was, however, denied
admission as a member as a result of an allegation that he had sexual
intercourse with a twelve-year-old student during his previous career as
a teacher. Mr. Spicer had been acquitted of this offence; however, the
student gave testimony before the Law Society Committee which was
supported by corroborative evidence. The Committee concluded "that
Mr. Spicer breached his fiduciary duty by engaging in sexual intercourse
with his 12-year-old pupil... [and] that Mr. Spicer was neither honest nor

46. Rajnauth, supranote 25.
47. Spicer, supranote 30.

Tending the Bar: The "Good Character"
Requirement for Law Society Admission

43

candid when testifying under oath".4" These findings of fact were held to
49
be "dispositive" on the issue of Mr. Spicer's character.
Another important decision comes from Quebec. On November 16,
1990, after an altercation in which his mother swung at him with a baseball
bat, Srbastien Brousseau stabbed her forty times and slit her throat. On the
advice of psychological experts the Crown charged Mr. Brousseau with
manslaughter. He was convicted and briefly imprisoned. Upon his release
in 1992 he attended law school but had difficulty obtaining admission
to the bar examination school. The Barreau du Quebec consistently (on
five occasions) refused to enrol Mr. Brousseau because of the severity of
.his past misconduct. It did this despite receiving considerable evidence
supportive of his rehabilitation and character." On May 31, 2006, after a
number of judicial review proceedings with respect to its decisions, the
Barreau agreed to enrol Mr. Brousseaui'
In his application for admission to the Law Society of Upper Canada
Joseph Schuchert presented a criminal history more extensive but less
serious than Mr. Brousseau's. Mr. Schuchert had been convicted of four
counts of mischief, one count of break and enter with intent to commit
theft, and two counts of theft under $1000. He was also convicted of
welfare fraud in the United States, was discharged from employment
and was "evicted from numerous premises, both private and public,
due to disruptive behaviour."52 Mr. Schuchert had been pardoned for his
convictions in Canada. The Committee additionally heard evidence about
his troubled childhood, the substance abuse which coincided with his
criminal convictions, his significant period of sobriety and freedom from
criminal convictions prior to his application, and the treatment which he
had received. Finally, the Committee received a number ofvery supportive
character references. This history, when combined with the panel's
assessment of Mr. Schuchert as a witness, led the Committee to conclude
that he was presently of goodcharacter and should be admitted.
The next case addressed issues of dishonesty outside the criminal
context. Alan Preyra had falsified his academic record in applying for
articling positions with prospective employers. He was also not completely
48. Ibid. at para. 48.
49. Ibid. at para. 52.
50. This evidence is mentioned in the 2001 decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal which overturned
the then Professions Tribunal decision permitting Mr. Brousseau to enrol and restored the negative
decision of the Barreau: Brousseau v. Barreau du Quebec (2001) 200 D.L.R. (41h)470 at 487 (Qc.
C.A.) [Brousseau].
51. Tu Thanh Ha, "Quebec killer wins right to become lawyer" The Globe and Mail (7 July 2006),
online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
52. Schuchert, supranote 37 at para. 6.
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open with various people in his life, including his employers, until just
before the Law Society of Upper Canada's hearing into his application.
In the first hearing into his application53 Mr. Preyra gave information
about his stable home life and supportive information from his articling
principals. However, there was extensive expert evidence presented which,
while mixed, was in general not supportive. In particular, a psychologist
testified that Mr. Preyra had, in his view, attempted to manipulate the
psychological testing and "was still overly vulnerable to engaging in
duplicitous impression management to a dangerous degree". After this
hearing the Committee declined to admit Mr. Preyra:
The applicant engaged in duplicitous behavior over a long period. He failed
to be entirely honest about it for four years. This was not a single lapse
ofjudgment resulting from a stressful situation. Even after being caught,
the applicant had several opportunities to admit his misrepresentations to
all that he should have. He did not do so. As recently as one year before
the hearing, the applicant was still misrepresenting the truth to people
close to him, and was still failing to be honest with his articling principal,
and even with his own lawyer.
Mr. Preyra's application came before the Law Society again in 2003.14 On
this occasion Mr. Preyra was able to provide more supportive evidence
than previously. He had continued to work at the same law firm, members
of whom testified as to his honesty and competence, had had a stable and
successful family life and had received ongoing psychological counselling.
He completed further psychological testing without trying to manipulate
the results and obtained an outcome consistent with improvement in his
psychological functioning. On this basis the Committee concluded that it
was "satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that Mr. Preyra is now of
good character."55
Falsification of academic records was also viewed negatively by the
Law Society of Upper Canada in considering the application of Cheryl
D'Souza.56 Ms. D'Souza provided an altered transcript to a law firm with
whom she was seeking employment. She provided an accurate transcript
to the law firm after the alteration was noticed. She maintained to the firm,
and to the Law Society to whom the firm reported the incident, that the
provision of the altered transcript was negligent but inadvertent-she had
changed the grade in anger when she received it and in anticipation of an

53.
54.
55.
56.

Preyra#1, supranote 29.
Preyra v. Law Society of Upper Canada,[2003] L.S.D.D. no. 25 (QL) [Preyra #2].
Ibid atpara. 103.
D'Souza, supra note 37.

Tending the Bar: The "Good Character"
Requirement for Law Society Admission

45

appeal, but had not intended to provide it to a third party. This evidence
was not believed by the panel who also noted that she was not prepared
to admit her error. Based primarily on this assessment of her credibility,
and her failure to take responsibility for her actions, Ms. D'Souza was not
admitted.
The remaining cases of relevance to this analysis of the good character
requirement were issued by the Law Society of Upper Canada in the last
few years. In the first, the Law Society considered the application for
admission of Barry Miller who, when he was a physician in Manitoba, had
a sexual relationship with a patient and was consequently erased from the
Manitoba register of physicians. 7 He moved back to Ontario and attended
law school. He was not entirely forthright about what had occurred on his
initial application to the Law Society of Upper Canada for admission as
a student-at-law. After completing his articles in 1999, Dr. Miller did not
immediately apply to the Law Society for admission as a member. He
instead went through a period of therapy which resulted in favourable
expert testimony being entered on his behalf, in addition to other positive
character testimony which was provided. The totality of this evidence led
the Law Society Committee to conclude that "Dr. Miller was a man of
honesty, integrity and empathy". 8
In Law Society of Upper Canada v. Stevens,59 the Law Society
considered the application for membership of Stacey Stevens who was
facing six criminal charges arising from her actions as a commissioner
of oaths while a student at law. The charges had not yet proceeded to
trial, and portions of the decision dealing with the circumstances of the
charges are excised from the Law Society's decision. Counsel for the Law
Society conceded, however, that the Law Society was unable to prove the
criminal allegations on clear and convincing evidence. On the basis of the
presumption of innocence and the twenty-two favourable character letters
she provided, Ms. Stevens was admitted.
The Law Society of Upper Canada also admitted Alden Birman. Mr.
Birman was accused of sexually harassing an assistant at his law firm.
Mr. Birman never admitted that the harassment took place. Although
the Law Society rejected his account and found that there was clear and
convincing evidence of the harassment, they ultimately admitted Mr.
Birman after he took sensitivity training which satisfied the Law Society

57. Miller v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 ONLSHP 4, [2004] L.S.D.D. No. 8 (QL)
[Miller].
58. Ibid. at para. 23.
59. 2005 ONLSHP 15, [2005] L.S.D.D. No. 37 (QL) [Stevens].

46

The Dalhousie Law Joumal

the workplace and that
that he "understood the need for sensitivity 6in
0
sexual misconduct was wholly inappropriate.
Lynda Levesque had been convicted of perjury and sentenced to six
months in prison in Alberta.6 Ms. Levesque had claimed she was assaulted
by the father of her daughter. She testified to the assault at a preliminary
inquiry but then resiled from that testimony and, upon being compelled
to testify at trial by the Crown, testified falsely that she had not been
assaulted. She was convicted of perjury as a result of that testimony. At the
character hearing the Committee heard evidence about the perjury, positive
letters from numerous "professional and important people," and medical
evidence supportive of her application. On the basis of this evidence, and
on her testimony, which the Committee found to be "straightforward, 62
the Committee held that Ms. Levesque was of good character, describing
her as a "strong, independent and a responsible person, responsible to
employee and
her law school, responsible to her daughter, a 6responsible
3
balanced.
and
healthy
is
She
articling student.
A similarly positive determination of character was reached in the case
of Law Society of Upper Canada v. Shore.' Ms. Shore's daughter died
as a result of the negligence, and arguably criminal conduct, 65 of nurses
at the Toronto Hospital for Sick Children who improperly administered
morphine. The Crown laid criminal charges against the nurses and obtained
authorizations from Ms. Shore to disclose various hospital records to the
defence. Ms. Shore gave such authorizations; however, she destroyed one
document rather than passing it on to the Crown. She did this because the
document alleged that her daughter's pain symptoms were psychological
rather than physical, and Ms. Shore found this upsetting, particularly given
the doctor's conduct when they had met with him. During the trial of the
nurses, and prior to her own testimony, Ms. Shore voluntarily disclosed
the destruction of the document to the Crown and the charges against the
nurses were dropped.
Ms. Shore's actions were brought to the attention of the Law Society
by the lawyers who had represented the nurses. The lawyers also made
several other allegations against Ms. Shore. After an investigation and a
hearing into Ms. Shore's application, the Law Society considered only the
allegations related to the destruction of the document. Further, at the end
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Law Society of Upper Canadav. Birman, 2006 ONLSHP 32 at para. 23 [Binnan #2].
Levesque, supra note 37.
Ibid. at para. 23.
Ibid. at para. 22.
2006 ONLSHP 55 [Shore].
This was the conclusion of the coroner's inquest into Ms. Shore's daughter's death.
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of the hearing, the panel found that Ms. Shore was in fact of "exemplary"
character, and that her conduct was the unsurprising result of the
extraordinary stress and tension arising from the fact and circumstances
of her daughter's death:
We accept the evidence of the applicant herself and of the character
witnesses that her wrongdoing in 2002 was an aberration in what has
been, and continues to be, an exemplary life.... We conclude that the
applicant was in the most unenviable situation of conflict between her
integrity as a mother and her integrity as a member of civil society. The
evidence is clear that it was difficult, if not impossible, for her, in the
throes of extreme grief, to perceive the situation of conflict she found
herself facing.66
A very different assessment of character was made in the final case on
good character, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Burgess.67 Ms. Burgess

committed plagiarism when she was an undergraduate at the University
of Toronto and was accused of academic misconduct while a law student
at Queen's. When she was investigated by the Law Society Ms. Burgess
gave a detailed account of the University of Toronto incident in a twoand-a-half page letter to the Law Society. The letter claimed that/. the
plagiarism accusation arose because she used portions of a paper wnitten
in one course for another--essentially "submitting similar academic work
for two courses." She claimed that she decided for prudential reasons
not to contest the accusations even though she did not think she had
"violated the University's policy" or done "anything wrong." The general
tenor of Ms. Burgess's letter was that she had been wronged and had
suffered unwarranted negative consequences. After further investigation,
however, the Law Society discovered from the University of Toronto's
Discipline Case Report that Ms. Burgess's account .of the plagiarism
accusation was wholly fabricated. In fact, the academic misconduct arose
from her submission of a paper obtained from the intemet as her own
work. Ms. Burgess later admitted her fabrication and testified that in
constructing her story she had reviewed the rules on academic misconduct
at the University of Toronto and chose the least morally culpable form
of sanctionable academic misconduct. Ms. Burgess offered various
reasons for her dishonesty with the Law Society including her inability
to forgive herself for the University of Toronto incident and fear of the
impact it would have when combined with the Queen's allegation. No
psychiatric or psychological evidence was presented to the Committee.
66. Supra note 64 at paras. 52-55.
67. 2006 ONLSHP 66 [Burgess].
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Given the severity and recent date of her duplicity, and the absence of
psychological evidence, the Committee found that Ms. Burgess was not
of good character.
Having briefly summarized the decisions on good character, I will
sketch out in the following sections the trends which are evident in them
as a whole. In particular, I will note the significant variability in how the
good character requirement has been applied. This variability is evident
in several respects. First, there is little consistency with respect to how
past misconduct will be treated. Second, there is little consistency with
respect to the significance which will be accorded to positive third party
references about the applicant. Third, there is significant variation in how
psychological evidence is used. Fourth, decisions often turn less on the
evidence received about the applicant than on the panel's impression of
the applicant as a witness during the proceeding. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, even when two cases present similarly on several evidentiary
levels, inconsistent outcomes may be reached.
b. Varying consequences ofpast misconduct
The first, and perhaps most notable point, is that the nature of the past
misconduct has little predictive force in determining whether an applicant
will be found to have good character or not. It is clearly a relevant factor
in every decision, but it does not itself appear to play a determinative role
in the outcome of the case. Applicants whose past misconduct ranges from
belief in the merits of communism68 to pedophilic sexual assault,6 9 sexual
harassment,70 manslaughter, 71 insurance fraud,7 2 plagiarism, dishonesty
towards the law society 73 and falsification of academic records 74 have all
been rejected, at least for some time. On the other hand, applicants who77
76
have committed election fraud, 71 sexual abuse of a patient, perjury,
alleged falsification of affidavits as a commissioner of oaths,78 suppression
of evidence in a criminal proceeding 79 and various property and violent

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Martin, supranote 40.
P(DM, supra note 28 and Spicer,supranote 30.
Birman #1, supranote 35 and Birman #2, supra note 60.
Brousseau,supra note 50.
Rajnauth,supranote 25.
Burgess, supra note 67.
Preyra #1, supranote 29 and D"Souza, supranote 37.
Rizzotto, supranote 39.
Miller, supranote 57.
Levesque, supranote 37.
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offences"° have all been accepted. In addition, some applicants-such as
Brousseau and Preyra-have been denied admission initially but later
admitted, even though the nature of their past misconduct remains the
same.
This lack of predictive force can, at least in part, be explained by the
fact that the focus of the assessment of good character is on an applicant's
current character, not on past misconduct or the "risk of future abuse
by the applicant of the public trust."'" However, since the question of
character only arises because of the existence of the past misconduct, it is
still notable that there is so little predictive relationship between the nature
of the misconduct and the decision on admission. This is particularly so
given that one of the few clearly ascertainable--"objective"-facts about
an applicant which can be considered is the previous misconduct. Other
evidence, such as supportive letters of reference, is always presented in
support ofan application, and often rests on impressionistic senses about the
applicant rather than on specific facts about his behaviour. Nonetheless, it
is clear that the objective facts of past misconduct have had little predictive
value in determining the outcomes of the reported cases.
c. Positive characterreferences
Every applicant presents positive references to support his application. For
example, DMP provided highly favourable references, with one going so
far as to say that it would be "a tragedy for him and the legal profession
if such a talented person were to be shut out." 2 Similarly, Aidan Burgess
received support from her articling principal, an associate at her law firm,
and two of her professors from law school. Although the referees were not
fully apprised of the nature of Ms. Burgess's plagiarism at the time they
provided their letters, none of them withdrew their support upon being
informed of the true facts. In particular, Ms. Burgess' articling principal
testified that even after her disclosure he continued "to regard her as a
person of good character."83 For neither DMP nor Ms. Burgess, however,
84
was this evidence sufficient to constitute good character.

80. Schuchert, supranote 37.
81. Preyra #1, supranote 29 at para. 8.
82. P(DM), supra note 28 at 12.
83. Burgess, supra note 67 at para. 42.
84. This is also the case for other applicants denied admission. Ms. D'Souza presented evidence
from her articling principal that she was of "[eixcellent character" and from another lawyer to the
effect that she was "a very fine person whom she [the witness] would be happy to have in her own
office." D'Souza,supra note 37 at paras. 35, 39.
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By contrast, for some of the applicants admitted to the bar, the
character evidence from third parties has been viewed as highly significant
in establishing good character. Convocation overturned the Committee
decision denying admission to Joseph Rizzotto in large part because the
Committee gave insufficient weight to the character references from Mr.
Rizzotto's law school professors:
Both Dean Gold and Professor Whiteside are respected members of the
legal profession who worked closely with Mr. Rizzotto for three years
at the University of Windsor Law School. Each has vouched for Mr.
Rizzotto's good character. Convocation believes that the evidence of
Dean Gold and Professor Whiteside is sufficient to permit it to substitute
its opinion for that of the Committee in this case given the [other] errors
in principle...85

Similarly, in deciding to admit Lynda Levesque despite her conviction
for perjury, the Law Society relied extensively on the letters from
"Many professional and important people" which indicated the writers
were "proud of Ms. Levesque and proud to support her application." 6
And finally, in Stevens, the Committee appears to have relied heavily on
character evidence filed on her behalf which spoke "of her moral and
ethical trustworthiness and suitability as a candidate for admission to the
Society.""7
In general there is little consistency in how third party character
information is viewed by decision-makers. It appears to be used largely to
bolster the decision-maker's own impression of the applicant's character,
gained from his or her "sense" of the evidence and of the applicant's
testimony.
d. Psychologicalevidence
There is also considerable variation in the decisions' treatment of
psychological evidence. In some cases the evidence is viewed as highly
significant. Thus in P(DM), while some of the expert evidence suggested
that DMP had been cured, other evidence contradicted this result
and weighed heavily in the Committee's decision to deny admission.
Likewise, in both Preyra judgments the decision-makers relied heavily
on expert psychological evidence in deciding not to admit Mr. Preyra in
the first instance, and then to admit him in the second instance. Evidence
of psychological counselling and treatment was also viewed as probative

85. Rizzotto, supranote 39 at para. 35.
86. Levesque, supranote 37 at para. 10.
87. Stevens, supranote 59 at para. 31.
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in allowing the admission of Mr. Miller and Mr. Birman. 88 Finally, in
Burgess, the panel was troubled by the absence of psychological evidence
with respect to Ms. Burgess, noting that they "would have found it helpful
if we had had some psychiatric and/or psychological evidence presented
to us concerning Ms. Burgess and concerning the behaviour that she
'89
engaged in.
In other cases, however, no psychological evidence was presented
to, or relied upon, by the panel in making its decision. No psychological
evidence was presented with respect to Mr. Rizzotto, Ms. Stevens or Mr.
Schuchert, all of whom were admitted. Nor was it presented with respect
to Ms. D'Souza or Mr. Spicer, both of whom were denied admission.
As is the case with supportive character evidence, psychological
evidence can be a factor in the determination of character, but its relevance
varies. In some cases it seems to operate more to bolster an existing
impression of an applicant than to carry independent significance.
e. Assessment of the applicantas a witness
Part of the reason for the sense of unpredictability and variability which
arises from reading the decisions stems from the fact that in a number
of cases an important factor appears to be the panel's impression of the
applicant as a witness. For example, in P(DM) the panel noted DMP's
"lack of candour in giving his evidence." 90 In Spicer the panel determined
that Mr. Spicer did not testify truthfully about his sexual relationship with
his student and concluded that this fact "[led] inexorably to the conclusion
that Mr. Spicer was not of good character at the time he testified before
the Committee." 91 In D 'Souza the panel was strongly influenced by the
"unsatisfactory evidence of the applicant herself'. 92 In Rizzotto the initial
Committee relied on the fact that Mr. Rizzotto's "demeanor on the stand
displayed a certain caginess bordering on arrogance ...
he was, at times,
evasive, argumentative and combative" (note though that Convocation
later rejected this finding as too generalized).
By contrast, in Levesque the panel was struck by the fact that in giving
testimony Ms. Levesque "was straightforward. There was nothing wishywashy about her." 93 And in Schuchert the panel noted that the applicant's
"self-reporting was full and frank, and consistent with his presentation
88. Although in Mr. Birman's case the counselling was given by a law professor with a specialty in
harassment issues and not by a psychologist.
89. Butgess, supranote 67 at para. 58.
90.

P(DM), supranote 28 at 5.

91.
92.
93.

Spicer, supranote 30 at para. 51.
D 'Souza, supra37 at para.42.
Levesque, supranote 37 at para. 23.

52 The Dalhousie Law Joumal

to the admissions panel as a man who was, with candour, fully revealing
his past conduct. ' 94 In Preyra #2, when deciding to admit Mr. Preyra to
the bar, the panel concluded that while"Mr. Preyra was "clearly anxious
and sporadically defensive" he also "acknowledged his past errors and
appeared to genuinely accept responsibility for them."95 In Shore, the
panel was impressed by the applicant's testimony and, in particular, the
fact that she "clearly, eloquently, and without qualification stated that her
96
actions were wrong".
In all of these cases, therefore, in addition to (or in substitution for)
evidence of past behaviour, psychological evidence and observations from
those who had known the applicant for some time, a central and almost
determinative factor was the panel's impressionistic sense of the applicant
as a witness. Since such impressions are necessarily highly subjective and
variable, this may account for the extent to which the decisions, when read
together, do not appear to present a consistent and coherent whole.
f. Inconsistencies on the totality of the evidence
Finally, there are some decisions which are difficult to reconcile even when
looking at the totality of the evidence. The most obvious example of this
comes from a comparison of the two leading decisions of the Law Society
of Upper Canada, P(DM)and Rizzotto. In both cases the conduct engaged in
was of a serious criminal nature, potentially or actually resulting in harm to
others. Further, while DMP's crime of pedophilic sexual assault was more
violent and corrosive than Mr. Rizzotto's election fraud, Mr. Rizzotto's
crime was arguably more closely related to the type of opportunity for
wrongdoing which is wont to arise in legal practice: Mr. Rizzotto occupied
a position of trust and authority which he breached by engaging in fraud.
Mr. Rizzotto and DMP were also both able to produce supportive character
references with respect to their moral character. As noted earlier, the panel
found the evidence filed with respect to Mr. Rizzotto to be particularly
persuasive, but it is worth noting that it was DMP who produced evidence
with respect to his work as a lawyer. Mr. Rizzotto's evidence arose rather
from his law school professors and Dean. It is, I would suggest, doubtful
whether such referees could have as extensive a knowledge of the ethical
character of an applicant as persons who have worked in legal practice
with him. In addition, as noted earlier, the panels who heard evidence from
DMP and Mr. Rizzotto were unimpressed with both of them. Finally, while
some of the psychological evidence filed on DMP's behalf was unhelpful,
94. Schuchert, supra note 37 at para. 21.
95. Preyra #2, supra note 54 at para. 23.
96. Shore, supranote 64 at para. 50.
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other evidence suggested that he had been cured and was unlikely to
re-offend. And Mr. Rizzotto appears to have provided no psychological
evidence with respect to his personal development. Certainly none was
relied upon or noted in the decision by Convocation to admit him.
Yet, at the end of the day, Mr. Rizzotto was admitted and DMP
was not. As Gavin MacKenzie rather caustically remarks following his
detailed discussion of these two cases, in which he similarly notes the
above incongruities, "One of them may have been correctly decided; it is
difficult to accept that both were." 97
5. Summary of the good characterrequirefent in Canada
The good character requirement is thus universally applicable, but only
superficially enforced both in terms of investigative efforts and numbers
of applicants excluded, and is oriented less towards the demonstration of
good character than towards the demonstration of rehabilitation from past
misconduct. The good character requirement is also shrouded in secrecy,
with extraordinarily limited public information available about what it
means, why it exists, how it is to be judged and who can be said to have,
or not have, the requisite good character.
The information which is available suggests that there is some clarity
amongst those applying the standard as to what good character means,
what the requirement's purposes are, and what factors are relevant in
determining whether an applicant possesses good character. There is
equally, however, considerable variability, uncertainty and incoherence in
how the good character requirement is applied to particular individuals.
Part III turns to a critique of the good character requirement. But
first, to place this discussion in some context, Part II briefly considers the
American good character requirement.
11, The good characterrequirement in the UnitedStates
The good character requirement has a long and storied history in the
American legal profession. In her seminal article Deborah Rhode describes
it as a "fixed star in an otherwise unsettled regulatory universe."98
Despite, or perhaps because of, this long history, American
commentators have not been enamoured with the good character
requirement. They have criticized its dubious premises and purposes, its

97.
98.

MacKenzie, supranote 4 at 23-12.
Rhode, supra note 7 at 496.
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inconsistent and unfair application, and its doubtful constitutionality.99 I
will rely on these commentators, and in particular Professor Rhode, both
in critiquing the Canadian good character requirement and in suggesting
how it should be reformed. This reliance must be cautious, however.
The "fixed star" of the good character requirement in the United States
only loosely parallels the Canadian experience. The remainder of the
section will note key similarities and differences between the approach
to reviewing character in the two jurisdict*ions and indicate the extent to
which American commentators can safely be relied upon in assessing the
Canadian good character requirement
A number of the features of the good character requirement as set
out in the previous sections are also present in its American counterpart.
As in Canada, the good character requirement is universally applicable to
those seeking bar admission.' It is a significant consumer of regulatory
resources.'01 It has been relatively inconsistently applied state-to-state
and individual-to-individual.0 2 Further, the emphasis of the inquiry in the
United States has similarly been on bad conduct in the past rather than on
a positive demonstration of present good character.'0 3 Finally, and most
importantly, its conceptual justification has also been found in the dual
04
need to protect both the public and the reputation of the profession.
There are, however, some significant differences between the Canadian
and American approaches to good character review. First, while there are
99. See, e.g.: Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics (St. Paul, MN.: West, 1986); Mark H.
Aultman, "Moral Character and Professional Regulation" (1994) 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 103; Michael
D. White, "Good Moral Character and Admission to the Bar: A Constitutionally Invalid Standard?"
(1979) 48 U. Cin. L. Rev. 876; M.A. Cunningham, "The Professional Image Standard: An Untold
Standard of Admission to the Bar" (1992) 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1015; Marshall Scott May, "Partin v. Bar
ofArkansas: The Good Moral Character Requirement for Arkansas Bar Applicants" (1997) 49 Ark.
L. Rev. 829; Marcus Ratcliff, "The Good Character Requirement: A Proposal for a Uniform National
Standard" (2000) 36 Tulsa L.J. 487; Arpa B. Stepanian, "Law Student Clerkships; Walking a Thin
Line Requirement of 'Good Moral Character' for Admission to the Bar" (2001) 3 J. Legal Advoc. &
Prac. 67.
100. Rhode, supranote 7 at 493.
101. Ibid. at 563.
102. Ibid. at 532-546. See also Richard R. Arnold, "Presumptive Disqualification and Prior Unlawful
Conduct: The Danger of Unpredictable Standards for Bar Applicants" (1997) Utah L. Rev. 63 at
64: "the shift toward a more flexible character standard poses particular problems of vagueness and
unpredictability" and Mark R. Privratsky, "A Critical Review Culminating in Practical Bar Examination
Application Techniques in Regards to the 'Good Moral Character Requirement' - In re Majorek, 244
Neb. 595, 508 N.W2d 275 (1993) (1995) 74 Neb. L. Rev. 324. There is some indication, though, that
Rhode's criticisms have influenced how the good character requirement is administered. See Patrick L.
Baude, "An Essay on the Regulation of the Legal Profession and the Future of Lawyers' Characters"
(1993) 68 Ind. L.J. 647 at 654. Further, as noted below, there are now published standards relating to
the good character requirement. See Arnold and, as well, Diane Van Aken, "Unraveling the Mystery
of the Character & Fitness Process" (2004) 83:10 Michigan Bar Journal 25.
103. Matthew A. Ritter, "The Ethics of Moral Character Determination: An Indeterminate Ethical
Reflection Upon Bar Admissions" (2002) 39 Cal. W.L. Rev. I at 47-5 1.
104. Rhode, supranote 7 at 507-512.
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inconsistencies in the application ofthe good character standard, there have
been numerous attempts in the United States, including by the American
Bar Association, to indicate how the requirement is to be applied. These
standards indicate the type of conduct which should give rise to character
review, and the factors which should qualify the significance of that past
conduct. 0 5 Second, there is in general greater transparency with respect
to the administration of the good character requirement in the United
Sates. This transparency is evident in the publication of standards and
information about the process of review, and in the publication of character
determinations by state decision-makers. Third, the .good character
requirement has, in general, been more rigorously enforced in the United
States. As noted, it appears that no Canadian jurisdiction undertakes
independent investigations of applicants who do not report character
06
issues. Such investigations do take place in the United States.
Fourth, there is a continuing history in the United States of excluding
applicants on the basis of their political beliefs. The numerous United
States Supreme Court decisions on the good character requirement all
arose from the exclusion of an applicant with alleged ties to the Communist
party or other suspect beliefs. 10 7 A recent case of notoriety arose from
the exclusion of a white supremacist who advocated violence.0 8 With the

105. Arnold, supra note 102 at 67-68. The type of conduct identified by the ABA includes, inter
alia, unlawful conduct, misconduct in employment, acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation, and evidence of mental or emotional instability. Arnold notes that every state has
"character standards that govern the admissibility of bar applicants."
106. Van Aken describes the Michigan investigative procedure as fdllows: "Once the application is
accepted, State Bar staff undertakes an investigation of each applicant. Various methods are used
to follow up on applicant responses; letters are sent, phone calls are made, and when needed, field
investigation is also done to collect information and interview witnesses. As information is received,
it is compared with the applicant's disclosures. The applicant may be asked to explain a discrepancy
between the applicant's disclosure and official records, or to explain a non-disclosure when information
is discovered during the course of the investigation. Once all information is collected for each file, the
file is viewed as a whole." Vah Aken, supranote 102 at 26.
107. Schware v. BoardofBar ExaminersofNew Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) [Schware](communism);
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (communism); Konigsberg v. State Bar
of California,366 U.S. 36 (1961) (communism); Re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (communismAnastaplo refused to answer questions with respect to communist party associations); Re Summers,
325 U.S. 561 (1945) (conscientious objection to military service); Baird v. State Bar ofArizona, 401
U.S. 1 (1971) (refusal to answer questions about Communist party membership); Re Stolar, 401 U.S.
23 (1971) (refusal to answer question about all organizational affiliations); Law Students Civil Rights
Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) (general challenge to questions asked by
New York State of bar applicants). A comprehensive discussion of these cases can be found in Theresa
Keeley, "Good Moral Character: Already an Unconstitutionally Vague Concept and Now Putting Bar
Applicants in a Post-9/l I World on an Elevated Threat Level" (2004) 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 844.
108. Richard L. Sloane, "Barbarian at the Gates: Revisiting the Case of Matthew F. Hale to Reaffirm
that Character and Fitness Evaluations Appropriately Preclude Racists from the Practice of Law"
(2002) 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 397.
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exception of Martin, the good character requirement in Canada does not
have a similar history (past or recent) of excluding applicants on the basis
of their political beliefs.
Fifth, analysis of the good character requirement in the United States
takes place against a constitutional backdrop. In American jurisprudence
the ability to obtain a licence to practise law enjoys status as a right which
cannot be denied without the demonstration of some rational connection
between the denial and the applicant's "fitness or capacity to practice
law."' 1 9 While discriminatory denial of bar admission has attracted
constitutional scrutiny in Canada,"0 to date this scrutiny has arisen from
the fact of discriminatory state action per se, not because the subject
matter of the discrimination was admission to the bar. "I
As a consequence, therefore, when analyzing and critiquing the
Canadian requirement I will draw on American commentators only with
respect to the administrative problems which arise in both jurisdictions,
and to the general justifications for the requirement.
III. Analyzing the good characterrequirement
This section assesses the good character requirement as applied in Canada,
following the organization of Part I. It will first consider problems arising
from the administration, of the requirement. It will then consider issues
arising with respect to the requirement's stated purposes. In particular, it
will assess the problems arising from the evidence of social psychology
that the premise underlying the idea that the good character requirement
can achieve its purposes-the idea that "character is the wellspring of
professional conduct"-is at best only partially true. Finally, in light of
this analysis, it will indicate the extent to which the current definition of
109. Schware, supranote 107, cited in Michael K. McChrystal, "A Structural Analysis of the Good
Moral Character Requirement for Bar Admission" (1984) 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 67 at 74.
110. Andrews v. Law Society ofBritish Columbia [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
111. It has been suggested that the good character requirement may suffer from unconstitutional
vagueness (see MacKenzie, supranote 4). There are, however, difficulties with applying the doctrine
of vagueness here. First, the case law on 'void for vagueness' arises from Canadian CharterofRights
and Freedoms, s. 7, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter] and it would therefore be necessary to demonstrate that a refusal of
admission to the bar engages the life, liberty and security of the person interest protected bys. 7 of
the Charter.While there is some Canadian case law affording s. 7 protection to economic rights like
a medical billing number (see Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) (1988),
53 D.L.R. (4th) 171, [1989] 2 W.W.R. I (B.C.C.A.), this will still be a difficult argument to sustain.
Second, much of the vagueness case law arises from the criminal and regulatory context, in which
there is an attempt by the state to sanction particular conduct, and there is uncertainty as to what that
conduct is. Given that even in its current problematic form the good character requirement is viewed
as preventative, not punitive, and is oriented towards current character, not past bad behaviour, it is
unclear that that case law would support a s. 7 vagueness challenge. Having said that, this argument
certainly warrants further consideration, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
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good character, the standards used for assessing it, and the application of
these standards in particular cases prevent the good character requirement
from achieving its purposes.
•1. Administration of the good characterrequirement
There are several evident problems with the administration of the
good character requirement. The first, while not of enormous practical
significance, is nonetheless notable: at the point of administration the good
character requirement is no such thing. Rather it is a requirement that an
applicant not have committed acts indicative of bad character. While the
focus of character hearings is said to be on an applicant's current good
character, such hearings only take place for applicants whose past bad
behaviour raises concerns about their character. At the administrative
stage the requirement focuses on badness, not goodness, and on conduct,
not character.1 2 While such an emphasis may be necessary in practice
and in principle,"' it does raise doubts about the extent to which the good
character requirement meaningfully ensures high ethical standards. The
best claim law societies can make is that the good character requirement
may occasionally exclude someone who poses a risk to the public; they
cannot make any broader claim that the requirement ensures high ethical
standards flowing from lawyers' demonstrably good characters. The good
character requirement is one in name only.
Further, and more significantly, because law societies do not undertake
independent investigation of applicants, there is no assurance that all
applicants with issues arising from prior misconduct have been identified.
Even a basic requirement that applicants provide a criminal record check,
or a social services check, 1 4 would significantly widen the scope of the
law societies' inquiries. As noted, in the United States such independent
investigation is a regular feature of the application of the good character
requirement.
The impact of this narrow scope of the law societies' investigations
on the enforcement of the requirement is heightened by the relative rarity
with which applicants who do raise good character issues are excluded. As
noted, only a handful of applicants are excluded from law society admission
in any given year across Canada." 5 Several American commentators

112. This point is explored in an interesting but highly abstract way'by Matthew Ritter, supra note
103.
113. Truly testing for good character would be enormously costly as well as intrusive.
114. Both of which are required, for example, before working as an aide for children with disabilities
in Alberta.
115. See supranotes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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have suggested that even where applicants present issues of character,
bar admissions bodies are reluctant to exclude them because, at the point
of application, the candidates have already invested considerable time
and effort in obtaining their professional qualification.' 16 That reluctance
may be operative in Canada as well, but ultimately, if the good character
requirement is necessary for the protection of the public, an applicant's
investment of three years in legal education is by itself an insufficient
reason to warrant her admission. "7
The narrow application of the good character requirement makes it
doubtful that the requirement provides any meaningful protection to the
public. Where there is limited screening of applicants, no independent
investigation and little will to exclude applicants with character issues, in
what sense has the public received any assurance about the character of
lawyers?
Yet, at the same time, for the few applicants who are subject to law
society scrutiny, a considerable burden is imposed. And while this burden
may be justifiable for some of those applicants, for many it is not. Take, for
example, the case of Sharon Shore, whose single act ofunethical behaviour
took place in circumstances of extreme grief and personal suffering, and
whose life was otherwise judged to be "exemplary." In the context of
hundreds of other applicants who have likely never faced these kinds of
pressures, but may well lack Ms. Shore's virtues of "integrity, candour,
empathy and honesty,""' 8 it is quite unfair for Ms. Shore'to have had to
face the delay, expense and publicity which the good character hearing
involved. If other applicants had faced similar scrutiny, Ms. Shore's
experience (especially in light of her clear wrongdoing in destroying the
document, described by the panel as a "wrong of the most serious kind"" 9 )
would be unproblematic. But the fact that she faced such scrutiny when
so few other applicants did so, even though it is statistically probable that
many of them would have engaged in questionable conduct, is incoherent
and unfair.
In addition, even with the narrow investigations conducted by Canadian
law societies, and the limited number of hearings which are held, there
is a financial cost (for the law societies) associated with administration
of the good character requirement. Staff and volunteers spend significant
amounts of time reviewing files and investigating applicants who do
116. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 7 at 515.
117. Although logically some burden should be placed on law schools to alert applicants to the good
character requirement.
118. Shore, supranote 64 at para. 47.
119. Ibid. atpara. 49.
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present problems. It is questionable whether, if the requirement is not
going to result in meaningful scrutiny, this expenditure of time and effort
20
is warranted.
The administration of the requirement is also, and most significantly,
problematic because of the secrecy with which it is cloaked. The law
societies claim that the good character requirement is designed to protect
the public and maintain public confidence in the legal profession, yet
outside of Ontario' 2' the public is entirely excluded from the process.
No information is provided for the public to monitor the basis on which
character is being assessed. There may well be numerous candidates
who would be judged by a member of the public as wholly lacking in
the "character" he would want his lawyer to have, but law societies do
not provide enough information to enable members of the public to make
those judgments for themselves.
Law societies may respond that secrecy is necessary to ensure that
those applicants who are ultimately found to be of good character have
their reputation and privacy protected. But surely, if the good character
requirement is to be justified as existing for the public good, the cost
of publicity is one which applicants for the privilege of bar admission
should bear. And since the applicant will have a public declaration of
good character in the end, it is arguable that any damage to reputation is
22

inconsequential. 1

The administration of the good character requirement is thus at once
both too narrow and too broad. It is too secretive, relies too heavily on selfreporting, focuses largely on bad conduct and not on good character, and
excludes only a tiny percentage of applicants for bar admission. On the
other hand, it places a considerable burden on the few applicants captured
by it and upon the various law society staff and volunteers required to
administer it, all for the sake of denying admission to at most one or two
applicants each year.

120. This point is emphasized by Rhode, supranote 7 at 563-566.
121. And recently Nova Scotia.
122. It is acknowledged, though, that the posited response of the law societies may have more weight
in the context of sporadic enforcement with its resulting unfairness to those applicants who do receive
scrutiny (like Ms. Shore). Having said that, 'remedying' the wrongs caused by an inadequate system
by ensuring that no one knows about them is not an outcome generally favoured in democratic legal
systems. See infra note 154 and accompanying text for discussion of the argument that the effect of
publicity may be entirely positive for applicants like Ms. Shore whose character is inaccurately called
into question.
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2. Purposesof the good characterrequirement
a. Introduction
What, though, of the purposes the good character requirement serves? As
discussed in Part 1.2, above, the purposes of the good character requirement
are said to be to protect the public, promote ethical conduct by lawyers and
maintain public confidence in the legal profession. This section assesses
these purposes and considers first, whether they are legitimate on their
own terms and, second, even if they are, whether any logical relationship
exists between them and the good character requirement.
b. Are the purposes of the good characterrequirement legitimate?
The purposes which the good character requirement serve are, on the whole,
primafacie legitimate. Indeed, protection of the public and promotion of
ethical conduct by practising lawyers are precisely where the regulation of
lawyers should be directed.
The only purpose which is not primafacie legitimate is the assertion
that the good character requirement is necessary for maintenance of the
legal profession's reputation. That purpose can be criticized on the basis
that it is simply an attempt to ensure that lawyers "look good" to the public,
1' 23
and can maintain their "regulatory autonomy and economic monopoly.'
Even if the good character requirement achieves this goal it is by no means
clear that such a goal is worth achieving. As cogently assessed by Deborah
Rhode:
Even as a theoretical matter, however, this rationale for character
screening remains problematic. While these professional interests help
explain, they fail adequately to justify the bar's attachment to character
screening. To prevent or deter individuals from entering a profession
in order to promote the reputation, autonomy, or monopoly of existing
members is troubling on constitutional as well as public policy grounds.
Taken to its logical extreme, this rationale would support exclusion
of any applicant whose conduct the local bar deemed unbecoming or
likely to taint its public image. Particularly in a profession charged with
safeguarding the rights of the unpopular, the price of such unbounded
licensing discretion could be substantial.2 4
As noted in Part 1.2, however, it appears in Canada that concern with the
profession's reputation is the harm which would follow from admitting
lawyers who will be unethical. The profession wants to maintain or
promote its reputation as a profession constituted of ethical practitioners,

123. Rhode, supranote 7 at 511.
124. Ibid.at512.
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not simply to bolster the general public perception of lawyers. To that
extent a concern with the public perception of lawyers is a legitimate area
of regulatory focus.
Further, though, even if this purpose is unjustifiable-if, for example,
the more credible view is that the profession's concern here is with its
"regulatory autonomy and economic monopoly"-the other purposes
of the good character requirement remain legitimate. If, therefore, the
good character requirement fulfills these purposes-if it ensures the
maintenance of high ethical standards and if the public is protected from
unethical behaviour-then it is normatively justifiable.
c. Can a good characterrequirementachieve its statedpurposes?
This leads, however, to the next important question: is there any logical
relationship between the good character requirement and success in
ensuring that lawyers are ethical so that the public is protected? As noted
earlier, the idea that the good character requirement can fulfill these goals
rests on the premise that "character" is a reliable indicator of a person's
ethics, and that an absence of good character in an applicant indicates a
greater likelihood that that applicant will be an unethical lawyer. Unless
character determines conduct in this way, having a good character
requirement is not logically related to ensuring ethical conduct among
practising lawyers. And without that logical relationship the requirement
cannot be normatively justified (even if its purposes can be).' 25
It is impossible to prove that conduct flows from character, and
some have argued that the assertion that it does is largely indefensible.' 26
However, when considered in light of its philosophical history, and the
evidence of social psychology, the premise that character determines
conduct can make a qualified claim to correctness. To demonstrate this
position, and to articulate the nature of that qualified claim, this section
will first briefly consider the "virtue ethics" view of the relevance of
character to conduct. Second, it will review social psychology's contrary
assertion that circumstances, not character, determine conduct. Finally, it

125. A deeper criticism of the good character requirement would acknowledge the potential truth of
the premise that character determines conduct but assert that there is nonetheless no rational reason
for concern with the character of bar applicants. There is no reason, for example, why we should be
more concerned about the future conduct of prospective lawyers than that of grocers. This deeper
criticism is rejected for this paper. If it can be demonstrated that the character of applicants to the bar
is relevant to their conduct as lawyers, and that their characters can in this sense be determined, then
the maintenance of a good character requirement seems eminently justifiable. The ethical conduct of
lawyers matters. It may be that the good character requirement could be done away with without harm
in practice-as argued for by Rhode, for example - but it is not unjustifiable.
126. Rhode, supra note 7 at 556-59.
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will re-assert the relevance of character to conduct as properly qualified by
the social psychology evidence.
Virtue ethics - the relevance of character
The notion of character as a source of conduct has ancient philosophical
roots, and continues to have modem philosophical credibility. Virtue
ethics posits that a person of good character will have virtues that orient
him towards conduct consistent with the maintenance of those virtues.
This is not the significance or purpose of the virtues (which is rather their
contribution to human flourishing), but it is an observable effect which the
virtues have.127 A person with the virtue of honesty, for example, will tend
to choose conduct consistent with honesty over conduct which is not.
In order to exercise the virtues a person must also have phronesis or
"practical judgment." It is not enough to value honesty; you must also
have the judgment to understand what honesty requires in a particular
situation and, more significantly, to know how to weigh honesty and pursue
it consistently with other virtues such as compassion or benevolence.
Virtue ethics eschews the notion of specific rules as the source of ethical
guidance-the Kantian position that, for example, because honesty is
required by the categorical imperative there are no circumstances in which
a lie is justified-and argues instead that it is our virtues of character
which, when exercised through our practical judgment, will lead us to
28
ethical action: 1
Virtues are the excellencies that lead us toward the ultimate telos.
Vices impede this journey. Virtues are skills. Virtues are also traits of
127. From the perspective of virtue ethics the significance of the virtues is their relationship to the
leading of a good life. In his seminal work on virtue ethics Alisdair Maclntyre describes the function
of the virtues as follows: "A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of
which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which
effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods." Alisdair MacIntrye, After Virtue: A Study
in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) at 178. Having said that,
however, the connection between virtue and action, as observed by virtue ethics, is the central point
of relevance for our discussion here. That is, while the importance of the virtues in virtue ethics arises
from their connection to the achievement of the good, virtue ethics also identifies the virtues as being,
when exercised through proper judgment, the source of rightful action. And it is this premise which, I
argue, underlies the good character requirement, and the critique of which is addressed here.
128. Some virtue ethicists go so far as to suggest that as a consequence the only way to judge an action
as ethical, or unethical, is through knowledge of the person who did it. This is called "arctaic agent
ethics." Most virtue ethics do not, however, go this far. See Jan Steutel & David Carr, "Virtue Ethics
and the Virtue Approach to Moral Education" in Jan Steutel & David Car, eds., Virtue Ethics and
Moral Education (London: Routledge, 1999) 3. For a critique of aretaic agent ethics see David Copp
& David Sobel, "Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics" (2004)
114 Ethics 514. Note as well that a third important part of virtue ethics is the concept of eudaimonia,
sometimes translated as "happiness" or "flourishing." Eudaimoniais the concept which informs both
what the virtues are and what a life exercised consistently with the virtues will consist of.
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character. They are habits or dispositions. Virtues not only allow us to
act in particular ways, "but also to feel particular ways." Virtues not only
empower us to do the right thing, they are essential to the determination
of what is right. Virtues and vices do not lead inexorably to rightful or
wrongful action because in varying degrees, we are free to act contrary
to our settled dispositions. But virtues make rightful
actionsfar more
129
likely, as vices make wrongful actions more likely.

For the virtue ethicist, the good character of a lawyer is what will determine
her human flourishing. It is also, though, what will impel that lawyer to
exercise herjudgment consistently with the virtues she possesses. A lawyer
who is honest, compassionate and just is more likely to make decisions
about how to practise law that are consistent with these virtues than will a
lawyer who is not honest, compassionate or just. She will not follow rules
of "honesty in all circumstances," "compassion in all circumstances"
or "justice in all circumstances." Rather she will exercise her judgment
to choose the course of action most appropriate and consistent with the
overall balance and pursuit of the virtues of honesty, compassion and
justice.
Socialpsychology - the relevance of circumstances

Despite its ancient lineage and modem philosophical credibility, virtue
ethics has been attacked on the basis that its premise of character as a
source of ethical conduct is inconsistent with the empirical evidence. That
evidence indicates that it is situations and circumstances, not "character,"
which dictate how people behave. John M. Doris, amongst others,
has argued that virtue ethicists and people in general tend to commit
30
fundamental attribution errors when observing the behaviour of others.'
If, for example, we see X tell the supermarket cashier that he has been
given too much change, we tend to assume that X is broadly possessed
129. James W. Perkins, "Virtues and the Lawyer" (1998) 38 Cath. Law. 185 at 198 [emphasis added,
footnotes omitted]. For discussion of virtue ethics, including its role in understanding legal ethics, see:
Rosalind Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics" Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (18 July 2007), online:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/> (Dr. Hursthouse is one of the leading modem virtue
ethicists); Marcia Homiak, "Moral Character" Stanford Encyclopedia & Philosophy (13 February
2007), online: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entrie/moral-character/>; Christine Swanton, "Virtue Ethics"
in N.J. Smelser & Paul B. Bates, eds., InternationalEncyclopediaof the SocialandBehavioralSciences
(Oxford: Pergamon, 2001) 16218-16224; Sherman J. Clark, "Law as Communitarian Virtue Ethics"
(2005) 53 Buff. L. Rev. 757; Robert Araujo, "The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigm and Possibility" (1997)
50 SMU L. Rev. 433; Rebecca S. Henry, "The Virtue in Discretion: Ethics, Justice, and Why Judges
Must be 'Students of the Soul' (1999) 25 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 65; Mark Neal Aaronson,
"Be Just to One Another: Preliminary Thoughts on Givility, Moral Character, and Professionalism"
(1995) 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 113; David Carr, "Character and Moral Choice in the Cultivation of
Virtue" (2003) 78 Philosophy 219.
130. John M. Doris, "Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics" (1998) 32:4 NoOs 504.
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of the virtue of honesty, and that if placed in another situation requiring
honesty, he will behave honestly. Social psychology tells us, however,
that this assumption is fallacious; it commits the "fundamental attribution
error" of positing a person's possession of the global virtue of honesty
from the evidence of a single honest action in a particular context.
Why do we know this assumption is fallacious? Because a variety
of behavioural experiments tells us that although human beings show
significant "temporal stability" in their behaviours-so that if given excess
change tomorrow X is likely to again tell the cashier that he was given too
much change-they show very little "cross-situational consistency"-so
that if X is placed is an entirely different situation he is no more statistically
likely to behave honestly than is someone else. That is, we can say that X
has the "local" character trait of honesty in dealing with retailers, but we
cannot say that he has the global character trait of honesty which will lead
him to be honest in other very different circumstances-as a lawyer filling
out his time sheets, for example. It is the relevant factors about a particular
situation which determine our behaviour, not global character traits which
we do (or do not) possess. 3'
Behavioural regularity and consistency in individual conduct exist but
they do so because the circumstances of our lives tend to be the same from
day to day--"the preponderance of our life circumstances may involve a
relatively structured range of situations"--not because we have global
character traits which predict how we behave.'32 Doris summarizes his
position as follows:
[B]ehavioral variation among individuals often owes more to distinct
circumstances than distinct personalities; the difference between
the person who behaves honestly and the one who fails to do so, for
example, may be more a function of situation than character. Moreover,
behavior may vary quite radically when compared with that expected
on the postulation of a given trait. We have little assurance that a person
to whom we attributed a trait will consistently behave in a trait-relevant
fashion across a run of trait-relevant situations with variable pressures
to such behavior... Behavioral evidence suggests that personality is
comprised of evaluatively fragmented trait-associations rather than
131. The most famous experiments relied upon in this critique are the Princeton theological seminary
experiment, in which there appeared to be no correlation between subjects' moral commitments and their
willingness to assist others (while there was a strong correlation between certain situational variables
and a willingness to help) and the Milgram experiment in which subjects were asked to administer
apparent electric shocks to participants. Other experiments similarly show the strong predictive force
of situational variables. These are discussed in Doris, ibid. as well as Gopal Sreenivasan, "Errors
about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution" (2002) 111 Mind 47 and Christian Miller, "Social
Psychology and Virtue Ethics" (2003) 7 Journal of Ethics 365.
132. Doris, supranote 130 at 508.
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evaluatively integrated ones: e.g., for a given person, a local disposition
to honesty will often be found together with local dispositions to
dishonesty. 33
To the social psychologist the overwhelming empirical evidence is that
it is the circumstances of the lawyer's life-the pressures, culture and
temptations of legal practice-which will dictate the ethics of his practice.
The lawyer's character as "honest," "compassionate" or 'just" are
simply labels we apply to that lawyer based on the random observation
of particular acts; those labels have no predictive force whatsoever in
determining how that lawyer will act in the future should her circumstances
change. Further, and more importantly, the assessment of an applicant's
pre-lawyer "character"-which will almost always be in circumstances
removed from legal practice-has no predictive force whatsoever about
the kind of lawyer she will be.
Re-asserting character
There are two significant responses to this social psychology-based
criticism which qualify (but do not wholly dispute) its rejection of the
relevance of character. The first, which Doris himself acknowledges, is
that the existence of "local" character traits, particularly given the general
predictability and stability of human lives, does mean that human behaviour
is predictable and, at least to some extent, follows from character, insofar
as character is a collection of local personality traits. It is, at least in part
for these reasons, a psychological truism that the "best predictor of future
behaviour is past behaviour." As a consequence, therefore, and in spite
of social psychology's observations about the lack of cross-situational
consistency in human behaviour, where a lawyer misappropriated trust
funds from a client it would be predictable that that lawyer is at high
risk to do so again. The lawyer can be appropriately labelled as having
the local character trait of dishonesty in the circumstances of managing
"
client funds; 34
' her past behaviour in those circumstances is a good
predictor of her future behaviour in similar circumstances. The fact
that that lawyer might be honest when dealing with her spouse does not
alter the predictive force of dishonesty with respect to her management
of her client's accounts. There are, as Doris notes, "temporally stable,
situation-particular, 'local' traits that may reflect dispositional differences
'
among persons"135
which influence behaviour, and which, if known, have

133. Ibid.at 508-9.
134. Assuming there is no evidence which suggests it is incorrect to draw that inference.
135. Supra note 130 at 507.
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predictive force with respect to how that person will behave in the same
situation in the future.
Second, however, and with respect to the continuing relevance of
broader character traits to the determination of conduct, virtue ethics
gives far greater scope to situational variation in behaviour than its social
psychology based critics acknowledge. Virtue ethics acknowledges that
making decisions about how to act always requires judgment, and that
judgment requires factoring in information about the situation orie is
confronting and about how a particular virtue should be measured against
others in those circumstances. Thus, while one may judge the participants
in Milgram's notorious experiment as having made a faulty decision
when choosing (apparently) to administer electric shocks to participants,
that decision may have been consistent with virtues such as "respect for
authority, trust, honouring commitments (fidelity), and appreciation of (the
value) of knowledge. 13 6 It does not demonstrate that there is no such thing
as a virtue of compassion which motivates the decisions of those who
possess it.'37 In other words, virtue ethics recognizes and indeed asserts,
far more than its deontological counterparts, the relevance and significance
of circumstances in influencing decisions about what constitutes virtuous
conduct. The virtues motivate ethical decisions, but it is through judgment
of what the circumstances require that ethical decisions are made. Predicting
behaviour from virtue ethics requires consideration of both character and
circumstances.
It appears, then, that when considering both virtue ethics and social
psychology it is fair to say that character plays a role in predicting conduct.
However, it is also the case that the circumstances and context of ethical
decisions, whether because they affect the exercise of judgment about
what the virtues require, or because they have an independent influence on
human behaviour, are highly significant in affecting ethical decisions.
What this means, in turn, for the purposes of the good character
requirement, is that, while in theory admitting only'applicants of good

136. Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at
31.
137. Sreenivasan argues that to truly demonstrate that an absence of cross-situational consistency
also means that there are no such things as virtues you would have to have three experiment controls:
"(i) each behavioural measure must specify a response that represents a central or paradigm case
of what that trait requires; (ii) the concrete situation each specifies must not have any features that
defeat the reason on account of which that trait requires the response in question; and (iii) the subject
and the observer must agree on these characterizations of the specified responses and situations."
Sreenivasan, supranote 131 at 61-62. Not surprisingly, Sreenivasan concludes that none of the social
psychology experiments purporting to show the non-existence of virtues satisfies this criterion. For
another criticism of the social psychology-based critiques of virtue ethics see Miller, supranote 131.
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character could ensure lawyers of the highest ethical standards, protection
of the public and maintenance of confidence in the legal profession, in
practice identifying lawyers with the relevant character traits for ethical
lawyering is a task of no small magnitude. How this task might be
accomplished will be discussed in Part IV. Before turning to that analysis,
however, the remainder of this Part will assess the extent to which, given
the foregoing critique, the current good character requirement fulfills
its purposes. That is, it will assess the extent to which the current good
character requirement does identify the relevant character issues which
may be predictive of future unethical conduct and, therefore, the extent
to which the current good character requirement protects the public and
maintains the legal profession's reputation.
3. The definition ofgood character,the standards used to assess
character,and the applicationof those standardsin particularcases
As previously set-out in Part 1.3, law societies rely on a general definition
of character as an individual's moral character and her possession of "an
amalgam of virtuous or socially acceptable attributes or traits."138 They rely,
in other words, on a traditional virtue-based understanding of character in
which the focus is on global character traits which will determine conduct
with cross-situational consistency. As just noted, however, it is not at all
obvious that such global character traits exist, or that identification of
character traits from behaviour in very different circumstances indicates
much about the applicant's ethical conduct as a lawyer. It is an applicant's
character as understood more specifically-as possessing the virtues
relevant for legal practice, and the capacity to exercise them in the
circumstances of legal practice-which is primarily relevant. As currently
set out, the definition of good character is too general. It inappropriately
orients the inquiry away from specific concerns with an applicant's ability
to practise law ethically, towards a general impressionistic analysis of
whether the applicant is, or is not, virtuous.
The standards used to measure character also appear problematic for
fulfilling the good character requirement's purposes. When law societies
require no consideration of the applicant's future conduct as a lawyer
they automatically render the inquiry into the applicant's character inapt
for what the good character requirement is supposed to accomplish. If
the question of future conduct is not relevant, then in what way does
the requirement even facially protect the public, ensure ethical lawyers

138. P(DM), supranote 28 at 22.
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and maintain public confidence in the ethics and competence of the
profession?'39
But quite apart from the obvious problem created by the refusal to
consider the issue of future misconduct, the standards used to assess good
character do not focus on the relevant questions. In particular, they do
not focus on whether the applicant lacks (or possesses) the virtues for
ethical lawyering and has demonstrated an (in)ability to exercise those
virtues in circumstances akin to legal practice. Some of the existing
decisions do directly and expressly connect the applicant's behaviour
with the particular virtues required in the circumstances of legal practice,
and assess the significance of the applicant's prior behaviour in that light.
Thus, in Burgess, the panel's concern with the applicant's plagiarism and
dishonesty with the law society arose in large part because those actions
"go to the very heart of who lawyers are, and what lawyers do. Integrity
is fundamental to the competence of a lawyer; competence necessarily
140
includes integrity.'
Far more commonly, however, the inquiries into character are not
focused carefully on the virtues required for legal practice and the extent to
which the conduct of the applicant demonstrates the absence (or presence)
of those virtues in circumstances akin to legal practice. In Rizzotto, for
example, there is no discussion of the extent to which involvement in the
management of an election is relatively similar to what a lawyer might do,
and that engaging in electoral fraud in those circumstances might indeed
be probative of the applicant's future conduct as a lawyer. Similarly, while
the panel decided to deny'admission to DMP, and could have explained
why the abuse of trust and disrespect for the rule of law which his
conduct reflected might be predictive of his future ethics as a lawyer, the
connections between his misconduct and his ethics as a future lawyer are
largely left implicit in the judgment. The decision seems to turn more on
a finding of bad character simpliciter rather than of bad character as of
predictive relevance for his future conduct as a lawyer. Indeed, one of the
final statements in the judgment is that DMP's "intellectual capability and
41
his academic andjob performancehave never been in dispute.'

139. These assertions of the non-relevance of future conduct lend credibility to assessments like
Rhode's which argue that the main thrust of the requirement is aimed at protection of the profession's
regulatory autonomy and economic monopoly. If this is so, then, as Rhode concludes, the requirement
cannot be justified. However, this paper gives the profession the benefit of the doubt and assumes that
the purposes are legitimate but that attempts to fulfil them have gone off track.
140. Supranote 67 at para. 9 [emphasis added].
141. P(DM), supranote 28 at 24 [emphasis added].
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Further, and significantly, the ability of the good character requirement
to fulfil its purposes is undermined by the unpredictable and inconsistent
nature of the decisions which apply it to individual applicants. As
noted above, it is difficult to find common threads running through
the judgments with respect to how past conduct, supportive character
evidence, psychological evidence or even fact patterns with an overall
degree of similarity will be treated. At the same time, highly subjective
and impressionistic factors such as the panel's view of the applicant's
credibility as a witness appear to be of considerable significance. It is
difficult to conclude in the light of this inconsistency that, even if the
standards articulated for assessing character are sufficient to satisfy
the requirement's purposes, the application of those standards to
particular individuals is actually doing so. Rather, the inconsistency and
unpredictability of application lend credence to the perspective expressed
by one American commentator that enforcement of the good character
requirement is one of the few places in the legal system where one can
argue that Oscar Wilde's quip that "Morality is simply the attitude we
adopt toward people whom we personally dislike" has some force.'42
Previous Canadian commentators on the good character requirement
share this view. As noted earlier, Gavin MacKenzie has suggested
that some of the decisions issued are simply irreconcilable. And Allan
Hutchinson is characteristically blunt in his assessment that "[t]he fact is
that law societies have played fast and loose with what does and does not
' 43
amount to good character.'
A defence to this criticism may be that a lack of certainty and
predictability in the application of standards to particular facts is not
in itself problematic. After all, even in straightforward legal areas like
whether there is an "offer" for forming a contract, the decision can be
impressionistic and dependent on the totality of the "language used and
the circumstances of the particular case" rather than on one particular fact
about the parties' dealings with each other. 44 However, the variability in
the application of the standards for good character is, I would suggest,
far more significant than the variability within legal areas like contract
offer. Although there is variation in the contract cases, there are also
broad patterns of consistency, and experienced lawyers generally have
no difficulty in drawing defensible conclusions about whether a set of

142. Cited by Privatsky, supra note 102 at 325.
143. Hutchinson, supra note 4 at 63.
144. See, e.g., CanadianDyersAssociationLtd. v. Burton (1920), 47 O.L.R. 259 at 260 (Ont. S.C.(H.
C. Div.)).
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facts will be viewed as creating an offer or not. Further, when combined
with the issues which arise in general with the administration of the good
character requirement, its purposes, its definition and its standards, the
inconsistency in the application of the requirement becomes of greater
concern. The variability of fact-specific assessments of contract offer takes
place within a stable, predictable and largely coherent legal structure. The
variability in the application of the good character standard does not.
There is, additionally, little reason to be confident in the accuracy of a
processwhich is impressionistic rather than focused on consistent treatment
of different types of evidence. As Rhode notes, subjective assessments
of the character of applicants, and drawing predictive conclusions from
those assessments, is of doubtful accuracy and validity even in the best of
circumstances. 145 And while others, as discussed below,' 1 have suggested
that it is possible, if relying on focused and objective criteria, to improve
the predictive accuracy of the character review process, the standards
and application used here do not satisfy that requirement. The standards
do not clearly delineate and focus on the virtues and character required
for ethical lawyering and, when applied, they provide no predictive or
rationally explicable distinction between those applicants who have, and
those who do not have, the moral character of the good lawyer.
4. Conclusion
In sum, then, the good character requirement is incoherently administered,
provides little real scrutiny of most applicants yet too much of some, and
proceeds in unjustifiable secrecy. The purposes which the requirement
serves are laudable, but the premise on the basis of which it is asserted that
a good character requirement will fulfil those purposes, is only accurate
in a highly qualified form. Further, there is little reason to believe that, as
currently defined and applied, the good character requirement is fulfilling
those purposes. The focus is on the applicant's character in general, rather
than on her character as measured against the virtues and circumstances
of lawyering, and there is often an express disavowal of the relevance
of the applicant's future conduct. Further, the inquiry into character is
impressionistic and personal rather than focused and objective, and there
is little predictability or rationality in the decisions reached in particular
cases.

145. Rhode, supra note 7 at 559.
146. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
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The next section focuses on some concrete proposals for improving
the good character requirement to ensure that its purposes can be better
served.
IV. Fixing the Good CharacterRequirement
In her seminal article on the good character requirement Deborah Rhode
argues strongly for its abolition. She proposes that the scarce resources
of state bar associations would be better directed towards disciplining
unethical lawyers in practice rather than on excluding applicants. While
this argument has merit, in my view, it excessively discounts the validity
of the purposes underlying the requirement 147 and the public interest in
ensuring that the public is protected from applicants who present character
issues which are legitimately relevant to their future conduct as lawyers.
When Aidan Burgess applied to the law society she had acted dishonestly
within an institutional setting for personal gain. She had also attempted
to subvert the quasi-judicial process reviewing her actions by a carefully
fabricated deceit with respect to her conduct. When the Law Society of
Upper Canada (or any other law society) admits someone to the bar it
provides some assurance to the public that the person in question has the
qualities relevant to legal practice,.both intellectual and practical. It gives
this assurance through its articling system and legal qualifications but also,
if done properly, through its good character requirement. Aidan Burgess
has, through her conduct, and in particular to the extent her conduct
involved an attempt to subvert legal proceedings, demonstrated an absence
of those qualities. The public, who naturally assume that a law society
plays a screening role in determining who is entitled to membership,
could feel legitimately resentful were the Law Society of Upper Canada
to represent that Ms. Burgess has the qualities relevant to ethical legal
practice. Indeed, in 1981 the Law Society of Upper Canada was sued by
individuals harmed by a lawyer who, they alleged, had raised issues of
character which the Law Society had failed to address at the time of the
48
lawyer's admission. 1

147. Rhode's article on good character was published in 1985. The bulk of the literature relied on in
this paper with respect to the role of character in predicting conduct was published subsequent to that
time. See supra notes 127-137. Having said that, the perspective that circumstances are the central
factor in determining conduct is certainly one with current subscribers (see, e.g., Philip Zimbardo, The
Lucifer Effect: UnderstandingHow Good People Turn Evil (New York: Random House, 2007)), and
the views adopted in this paper may simply arise from a disagreement between the author and Rhode
on this point.
148. Calvert v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 176 (Ont. H.Ct.J.). While the
action was struck on the basis that the pleadings as written disclosed no cause of action, the Court
suggested that with properly constructed pleadings such an action could be pursued.
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Similarly to Ms. Burgess, although in a quite different context,
DPM's past misconduct raises serious issues of character relevant to the
circumstances of legal practice. He took gross advantage of his position
of trust as a mentor to one young girl, and the father of another, to obtain
personal gratification at great harm to them. He abused their trust to further
his own advantage and, significantly, engaged in remarkable rationalization
in order to ignore the moral values underlying the legal prohibitions on
sexual abuse of minors. Absent overwhelmingly compelling evidence that
this behaviour-both the sexual assaults and the rationalizations-were
aberrational or corrected (which DPM did not provide), it is reasonable for
a law society to find that he lacked qualities relevant to good legal practice.
It is true that not every lawyer interacts with children or other vulnerable
persons, but every lawyer has an obligation to act as a fiduciary-to not
compromise his client's interests in furtherance of his own-and every
lawyer has an obligation not to use his powers of reason to subvert his
obligation to act within the law.
Moreover, it is possible to imagine plausible but hypothetical cases,
even more obvious than these, in which maintenance of the character
requirement seems essential. If, for example, a lawyer were to be disbarred
by the Law Society of Alberta for misappropriation of client funds and
then apply for admission to the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, it is
obvious that his admission should be denied on the basis of his character
149
as evidenced by his disbarment.
There is also some reason to believe that focused and objective admission
criteria can reduce the likelihood that later professional misconduct will
occur. In a study commissioned for the Minnesota bar, which had revised its
character requirements to make them more focused and objective, the files
of 52 members disciplined for professional misconduct were reviewed.
Of those 52 it was found that 26 raised issues which would have led to
character screening under the new criteria, a number far greater than the
20% of general applicants who raise issues leading to character screening.
There are several methodological issues with the Minnesota study arising
from its small sample size and the combination of the subjectivity which
exists even with the new Minnesota criteria and the use of retrospective
review of the application files (it is easier to find issues of character expost
facto). Having said that, a review of the outcomes from the study suggests
that "if the methodological problems can be resolved, it would be possible

149. One could argue simply for a requirement that no one who has been disbarred from one
law society can be admitted to another. However, I would argue that it is the facts underlying the
disbarment, as much as the disbarment itself, which should be relevant.
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to predict lawyer misconduct more effectively than is often supposed by
academic critics."' 150
The point of this section of the paper, then, is not to argue for abolition
of the good character requirement, but rather to suggest how the good
character requirement can be reformed to ensure that it better fulfills its
purposes. The necessary reforms are relatively straightforward and follow
from the issues raised with the good character requirement in the previous
section.
First; and most fundamentally, the good character requirement needs
to shift away from a concern with "character" understood generically and
impressionistically and towards a careful delineation of what constitutes
ethical lawyering, focusing on both the "virtues" of the ethical lawyer
and the circumstances of legal practice. It should attempt to identify the
existence (or absence) of "local" character traits, of those habits and ways
of acting in contexts similar to legal practice which suggest that an applicant
will, or will not, be an ethical lawyer. Identification of the local virtues of
the ethical lawyer is beyond the reach of this paper (and is properly the
subject of debate within the practising bar and the general public), but
honesty, respecting confidences, acting in the best interests of others even
at the expense of one's own self-interest, and integrity appear to be central
values reflected in the various codes of professional conduct applicable
in the Canadian provinces.' Conduct which shows an absence of those
virtues should, without something which clearly and objectively explains
the behaviour or suggests that the character traits which led to it have been
corrected, lead to denial of admission. This is particularly so where the
context is related to legal practice. If, for example, a chartered accountant
who had misappropriated client funds in her accountancy practice were
to apply for admission to legal practice, a law society could reasonably
conclude that her prior behaviour indicates the existence of vices in a
context highly similar to legal practice and should, absent an exceptional
explanation or reformation, lead to a denial of bar admission.
As Michael McChrystal has argued in the American context, the focus
needs to be less on an applicant's "character" writ large than on her "fitness"
for the ethical rigours of legal practice. A bar applicant should only be
denied admission if his "past misconduct... is rationally connected to his

150. Baude, supra note 102 at 655. The study and its issues are discussed at 654-656.
151. See Alice Woolley, "Integrity in Zealousness: Comparing the Standard Conceptions of the
Canadian and American Lawyer" (1996) 9 Can. J.L. & Jur. 61 and David M. Tanovich, "Law's
Ambition and the Reconstruction of Role Morality in Canada" (2005) 28 Dal. L.J. 267.
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fitness to practice law," and fitness needs to be carefully defined based on
the "standards imposed upon persons who actually practice law." '
The application of this more careful standard could easily have
changed the results of some of the cases considered here, and would have
changed the reasoning process in all of them. In Rizzotto, for example,
rather than receiving a pass on the need to verify his future conduct as a
lawyer, the onus would have been squarely on Mr. Rizzotto to explain why
the inference of relevant bad character which arises from his dishonesty
and duplicity in a position of responsibility similar to that occupied by a
lawyer should be overcome and admission granted. Absent some clear and
exceptional evidence, which does not appear to have been presented in
that case, his application should have been denied. Similarly, while Ms.
Levesque may under this standard still have been admitted because of the
circumstances surrounding her perjury, she would have had to explain
why the logical correlation between her deception of the court then, and
the concern that she will be unable to meet the requirement for honesty to
the court in all circumstances as a lawyer, should not be drawn. She would
have faced, in this respect, a more onerous burden than, for example, Mr.
Preyra whose deception, while significant, occurred in a context somewhat
different from that of legal practice.
Second, investigation of potential applicants should reach beyond the
simple self-reporting system currently used. While it may be unrealistic and
an undesirable allocation of resources to engage in extensive investigation
of every applicant, investigation* on at least an audit basis to increase the
likelihood of accurate reporting should be undertaken. Applicants should
be required to provide a list of individuals with personal knowledge of
them and, as well, to consent to the law society discussing their application
with others. In addition, as suggested earlier, applicants should be required
to submit criminal record and social services checks.
Third, the current regime of secrecy should be abandoned. The
public cannot derive any comfort from the current process, and wrongful
admissions will never be discovered, without the benefit of public reporting
and scrutiny.153 While decisions of the Law Society of Upper Canada may
have been the target of some of the criticism in this paper, in general it
deserves significant credit for allowing its decisions to be reviewed, and
for being accountable for them. In the end, it is far more likely that the
public will be protected, and applicants treated fairly, in the Law Society of
Upper Canada's system than in the others, where no material information
152. Supranote 109 at 101. See also supranote 14.
153. Wrongful denials of admission may come to light through judicial review.
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about what goes on is publicly available. For example, while this paper
has suggested that it is unfair for Sharon Shore to have faced character
scrutiny when so few applicants do so, it is important to note that this point
was made clearly and consistently by the national media as well. The light
of public scrutiny enabled public criticism and, perhaps, productively
focused the Law Society's consideration of her application.'54
Fourth, thought should be given to the timing of character review.
At the Law Society of Upper Canada most cases appear to have arisen at
the time the applicant was applying for membership-that is, after his or
her articles had been completed. In other cases, such as Brousseau, the
character consideration took place at the point of application for enrolment
as a student-at-law. Most law societies have the jurisdiction to consider
character at either time.
Arguably, as noted by the American commentators,'55 both these
points of time come too late-after the applicant has invested three years
in her legal education when a law society will be reluctant to decline her
admission. Of course, arguments can be made in favour of either of these
times. After a period of articles the law society will have more information
about the character of the applicant. On the other hand, an applicant with
serious character issues may pose a risk to the public if acting unethically
as a student-at-law, which warrants scrutinizing the applicant's character
prior to that opportunity being granted. Overall, I would argue that the
optimal approach to the timing of the character review would have the
following elements. Prior to attending law school an applicant should
be able to obtain detailed information from the law society to which she
hopes to gain admittance with respect to what the law society's good
character requirement consists of (the removal of secrecy would assist in
this respect). At the point of admission as a student-at-law, an applicant's
character should be reviewed. However, the law society should be given
the power to enrol an applicant as a student-at-law with additional
conditions if the applicant's character is in doubt, but is not sufficiently
in doubt to deny admission outright. The inherently supervisory nature of
articles makes such conditioning powers workable in the student-at-law
context in a way which they are not at the point of admission to legal
practice. These conditions could require, for example, that articles take
place within a firm approved by the law society, that the student have
154. See articles by Christie Blatchford in The Globe and Mail on Ms. Shore's application:
"aCALLtotheBAR" (24 June 2006), "A lawyer's 'good character' indeed" (1 5 August 2006), "Forever
her daughter's keeper" (16 August 2006) and "A touch of kindness at end of a hard road" (18 August
2006), archived online: <http://www.theglobeandmail. corn>.
155. See supranote 116 and accompanying text.
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more limited powers to appear in court than are usually granted, that the
student be supervised when meeting with clients, and that articles extend
beyond the usual time period. This conditioning power could also be used
to address the delay inherent in investigations into an applicant's character
- to allow the applicant to continue working towards qualification while
the investigation takes place. Finally, character should be reviewed again
at the point of admission to law society membership. This subsequent
review would look at issues arising or coming to light after articling has
taken place, but not at character issues previously adjudicated.
Fifth, all applicants should be advised that psychological evidence may
be relevant and probative to the inquiry. While such information must, as
noted by Rhode, be treated with caution as a predictive tool, it would level
the playing field if all applicants were advised of its relevance, and in those
cases in which it was provided it would also offer some guidance to the
law societies when evaluating the fitness of applicants for legal practice.
Finally, the true focus of the good character requirement should be
made clear. The requirement is not an assurance that lawyers admitted
to practice are of good moral character. It is an attempt to ensure that no
lawyers with obvious, relevant and unremedied flaws of character, flaws
which make them currently unfit for legal practice, are admitted. The rules
and legislation governing the requirement should be amended to reflect
this reality. Doing so would make the requirement less vague and more
accurate, and would focus the inquiry, as it should be, on the ethics of
lawyers and what is needed to fulfill them.
Conclusion
The good character requirement cannot, perhaps, be described as a "fixed
star" of lawyer regulation in Canada. It is, though, a significant feature of
our regulatory regime. While the requirement has a relatively small effect
on most applicants for bar admission, and a large one on only a handful of
applicants, it represents a significant exercise of regulatory power by the
provincial law societies.
Given that significance, the requirement warrants more attention than
has previously been given to it. In particular, if the law societies wish to
continue to use the requirement as a way of ensuring ethical conduct by
lawyers and protecting the public, a radical reworking of every aspect of the
requirement is necessary. Its administration must be changed to ensure that
it is transparent, coherent and fair. The enforcement of the requirementboth in terms of the general definition and standards articulated with respect
to character, and in terms of the application of those standards in particular
cases-must be entirely re-thought. Otherwise, the outcome will continue
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to be wasted law society resources and unfair burdens placed on individual
applicants, with little discernible impact on either the profession's ethics
or the public's protection.

